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5 1. Introduction 
The  primary objective  of this  situation  report  is  to 
review  the  impact  of  east  European  organised 
crime  (EE-OC)  on  the  Member States.  Evaluated 
open  source  material  (1),  especially the  so-called 
'grey  literature'  (2),  has  been  used  to supplement 
unclassified  data  and  information  provided  by the 
Member States. 
Unlike  the  previous  classified  versions  of this  re-
port,  this  updated  edition  is  not  exclusively  ad-
dressed to Member States'  law enforcement agen-
cies,  but  is  also  meant  to  be  disseminated  as 
widely as  possible.  For this purpose, a draft of this 
document was handed over to experts from Mem-
ber  States  during  a  meeting  held  at  Europol  on 
30 November and  1 December 2000, in  order for 
them to review its content as well as verify compli-
ance  with  data-protection  regulations  and  confi-
dentiality requirements. Additional  caution with  re-
gard  to  confidentiality  has  been  taken  by  willingly 
omitting  all  references  to  law  enforcement  docu-
ments  utilised  as  sources  for  the  information  in-
cluded  in  this report. 
It  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  certain  situations 
that  are  notoriously  common  in  different  geo-
graphical  areas  may  not always  be  covered  with 
equal  detail.  It  is  deeply  hoped  that these  intelli-
gence  and  information  gaps  will  be  closed  in  the 
near future through  stronger  cooperation  and  fur-
ther enhancement of information exchange, first of 
C)  Open  source information which  is  legally available  in  var-
ious sources  such  as  government public information  (e.g. 
open versions of the European organised crime situation 
report),  library  literature,  academic  public  reports,  private 
companies;  as  far  as  evaluated,  also  television  or  radio 
news,  scientific journals,  databases or maps. 
(2)  Sources that are  neither officially published  nor classified, 
which  can  consist of research  reports,  economic  reports, 
working  papers,  unofficial  governmental  documents,  pre-
prints, dissertations and theses, trade literature, discussion 
papers,  or newsletters. 
all  with the Member States,  but also  with other in-
ternational and third-State law enforcement autho-
rities.  This  is  a crucial  aspect  of one of the funda-
mental objectives that Europol is striving to achieve 
in  the  field  of law  enforcement  cooperation  and 
coordination  on  a European  Union-wide scale. 
This report also provides an  overview of the results 
of  a  quick  scan  of  available  research  and 
literature  (3)  concerning  EE-OC.  It  lays  out  the 
background  to  the  problem  and  outlines  the  cur-
rent  political  initiatives  undertaken  in  the  area  of 
cooperation with east  European  States. 
The breakdown of political and economic systems in 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) not only changed the 
long-term balance of lasting world politics, but also 
led to a parallel refocusing of public attention on the 
aspects of organised crime (OC). 
When  using  the  term  'east  European  organised 
crime',  Europol  is  referring  to  criminal  organisa-
tions which  have their origins  in  the former Soviet 
Union.  These  organisations  are  often  wrongly  re-
ferred to as 'Russian or Russian-speaking organised 
crime'  (ROC)  and  are  also  known  as  'Eurasian 
Crime',  the  'Russian  Mafiya',  the  'Red  Mafiya'  or, 
more  ironically,  the  'Vodka  Connection'.  However, 
within the EU  legal framework concerning the spe-
cific  issue,  EE-OC  should  include  organised  crime 
originating  at  least  from  Moldova,  Russia  and 
Ukraine, which  have  signed the so-called  partner-
ship  and  cooperation agreements  (PCAs)  with the 
European  Union. 
Under the terms of the European  Parliament 'Res-
olution  on  the  action  plan  to  combat  organised 
(3)  The  report  was  completed  with  current intelligence,  prin-
cipally  from  sources  which  were  compiling  strategic  re-
ports  or initiating intelligence gathering on  east  European 
organised crime groups. Open and sensitive sources were 
used, the  latter being appropriately sanitised. 
7 Former Soviet Union 
crime'  (4),  Belarus  should  also  be  included.  It 
should  be  taken  into account that  Russia  and  Be-
larus have recently formed a new union. According 
to the dynamic and  complex  structures  of EE-OC, 
all  other  FSU  countries  (5)  should  be  considered 
for the purpose of the issues  under discussion. 
Various  characteristics  belonging  to,  and  activities 
carried  out  by,  east  European  criminal  groups, 
along with the background of their members, lead 
to  the  belief  that  such  groups  are  highly  organ-
ised  (6).  For  example,  they  have  worldwide  con-
( 4)  Document 7421 /97-(4-1999/97. 
( 5)  Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Estonia,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyr-
gyzstan,  Latvia,  Lithuania,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan  and 
Uzbekistan.  Of special  interest  are  also  all  pre-accession 
States  (PAS),  especially  the  six  so-called  forerunners 
which include, besides Estonia, Cyprus, the Czech  Repub-
lic,  Hungary,  Poland  and  Slovenia.  Some  PAS  have  grow-
ing  importance  as  transit,  destination,  basis  or  depot 
countries for various illegal  commodities. 
( 6)  On  the contrary, according to Germany's findings in  1999 
(contribution  to the  1999  EU  OC  situation  report),  the 
structure of Russian  OC groups was determined either by 
the  family  or  the  modest  business  operations  involved. 
There was  no evidence of targeted  recruitment of special 
skills  in  any of the groups. The  structures examined were 
remarkably poorly organised  and  highly unprofessional  in 
comparison  with  other groups.  No clearly  delimited, per-
8 
nections and  have added  a new dimension to the 
face  of  the  international  criminal  world  as  they 
form hundreds of links with underground organisa-
tions  throughout  Europe  and  North  and  South 
America,  as  well  as  the  Middle  East  and  North 
Africa. 
These  groups  have  also  proven  themselves to be 
extremely  successful  in  accruing  and  transferring 
criminal  finances  on  an  international  scale  and 
have  thus  evolved  into  sophisticated  criminal  en-
terprises. Another noteworthy general characteristic 
of  EE-OC  groups  engaged  within  the  EU  is  their 
comparative  ruthlessness  and  violence,  which  In-
cludes contract killings  C). 
manent criminal grouping with internal rules,  clear recruit-
ment policies or recognisable specialisation among mem-
bers was found. In several cases,  it was difficult to find ev-
idence of lasting cooperation among Russian  suspects.  In 
only one  of the cases  examined  could  a permanent na-
ture of cooperation  be properly established. 
C)  According to the Russian  Ministry of the Interior, there are 
about  500 contract  murders  in  Russia  a year.  In  1999, 
there were twice as  many killings  as  in  previous years.  In 
addition,  a large  number of contract murders took place 
in the Member States. EE-OC  is  a very  unusual  coalition  of professional 
criminals,  former  members  of  the  underground 
economy,  members  of the former  Party  elite  and 
the security apparatus, which defies traditional con-
ceptions of OC  groups  (8). Furthermore, there are 
indications  that  young,  unscrupulous  economic 
managers,  computer  specialists  and  intellectuals 
are  increasingly engaged  in  this  coalition  (9). 
In  recent years,  EE-OC has become so  entrenched 
that local  governments cannot remove it.  This  situ-
ation  poses  threats  at  international  and  domestic 
levels,  particularly within the  EU  and  pre-accession 
States  (PAS)  (1°). 
Since  the collapse  of the  FSU,  the  economic and 
political  power  of  EE-OC  has  grown  dramatically. 
Various  sources  indicate  that,  within  the  last  10 
years,  criminal  earnings  have  approximately  in-
creased  from  less  than  RUB  1 billion to RUB  130 
billion - the size  of the Soviet national deficit. 
There are objective facts  illustrating the emergence 
of this  new threat.  Studies  have  shown that,  since 
1992, the  greatest  single  long-term  threat  collec-
tively facing the EU  has been the criminal finances 
originating from central  and  eastern  Europe  (CEE), 
particularly  Russia.  To  illustrate this  point,  by  1993 
the mostly unknown EE-OC groups in the past had 
become  a serious  criminal  presence  in  about 40 
countries throughout the western world. 
Already in  1993, the Royal  Canadian  Mounted Po-
lice  had  discovered  that  a  large  number  of the 
members  of  EE-OC  originated  from  a  unique 
group  of people that had  emerged  in  the  private 
sector following the collapse of the Soviet State.  In 
the  FSU,  these  people were  members  of security 
services,  the  Communist  Party  and  the  govern-
ment C 
1
). Within this context, it is logical that there 
is  a relationship  between  the opening of the  Iron 
Curtain  and the expansion  of criminal groups from 
the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States 
( 8)  Professor Louise Shelley, Post Soviet organized crime - A 
new form of authoritarianism,  United  States,  1998. 
( 9)  Professor  Jean  Ziegler,  Die  Barbaren  kommen,  Zurich, 
1999. 
(1°)  Countries that will  become  members  of the  EU  within  a 
few years. 
( 11 )  CISC,  Eastern  European  organised  crime  - Thieves' 
world,  Canada,  1997. 
(CIS)  (1 2). These  groups have  made the most out 
of the new opportunities by  increasing their crimi-
nal  activities  in  many  countries  of  the  western 
world. There  is  no doubt: EE-OC  is  moving west! 
According to Europol studies, EE-OC groups, which 
are  involved  in  financial  crime,  prostitution and  ex-
tortion  as  well  as  trafficking  in  drugs,  human  be-
ings,  stolen vehicles and  arms,  have  been increas-
ingly  active  in  almost  all  the  European  countries 
since  1994-95. 
Furthermore,  in  1997,  1998,  and  1999,  the  Eu-
ropol  Drugs  Unit/Europol published the European 
organised crime  situation  report  ( 13). The  contri-
butions  of several  Member States  showed  an  in-
creasing  involvement of EE-OC  in  illegal  activities 
within the  EU.  In  this  respect,  it was  recommend-
ed  that a project on  EE-OC  be  initiated at Europol 
in  order  to  obtain  a  comprehensive  overview  of 
the impact of EE-OC on the EU. 
(1 2)  The  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  includes  Ar-
menia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus,  Georgia,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzs-
tan,  Moldova,  Russia,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  Ukraine 
and  Uzbekistan. 
(1 3)  Europol,  European  organised crime situation report,  The 
Hague,  1997-99. 
9 2. Political and legal 
framework (
14
) 
The  EU  is  moving east - no question.  In  this way, 
the first  PAS  will  definitely  be  EU  Member States 
within  a few  years,  which  will  constitute  a  chal-
lenge for law enforcement agencies. 
The basis for cooperation between the EU  and east 
European States in this area was formed by the con-
clusions  from  the  meeting  between  the  EU  and 
Russia on 4 and 5 December 1996 in Helsinki. 
The  other  starting  point was  the  action  plan  on 
organised  crime  developed  by  the  high-level 
group  and  adopted  by  the  European  Council  of 
Amsterdam  on  16  and  17  June  1997.  The  UK 
Presidency  at that time set  out the background  to 
the  EU's  engagement  with  Russia  in  the  fight 
against OC  (1 4). 
EU-Russian  relations  took  a  significant  step  for-
wards  with  the  EU-Russia  partnership  and  co-
operation  agreement  (PCA),  which  came  into 
force  on  1  December  1997.  The  newly  founded 
Cooperation  Council  created  a  cooperation  com-
mittee in  January  1998. The  latter then started  es-
tablishing its  own sub-committees (Subcommittee 
A is  responsible for OC). 
The  EU-Ukraine  PCA  came  into  force  in  March 
1998 and  the EU-Moldova PCA - already signed 
in  November  1997 - came  into  force  on  1 July 
1998.  Structures  similar  to  the  EU-Russia  PCA 
were also  created  within  both  of these  PCAs  (Co-
operation Council/committees, etc.). 
EU  PCAs  with  east  European  countries are  unique 
external  relations  instruments  of  the  European 
Union that provide a structure for concrete and  co-
ordinated  actions.  They  are  the  only existing  legal 
frameworks for decisions on  all  aspects of the fight 
(1
4
)  Document  12784/97 Crimorg 28. 
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against  organised  crime  (1 5).  These  political  deci-
sions  indirectly function  as  directives for Europol's 
working programmes. As a consequence, Europol's 
EE-OC  project  has  to  put  most of its  efforts  into 
the abovementioned  PCA countries. 
The  Vienna  European  Council  in  December  1998 
called for stronger EU  action against OC  in  relation 
to the new possibilities opened by the Amsterdam 
Treaty.  In  this  respect,  a new 'EU  strategy for the 
beginning  of  the  new  millennium'  (1 6)  was 
adopted.  It  is  the basis  for common European  ac-
tivities concerning OC. The  EU  strategy stresses the 
responsibility  of Europol  and  its  intermediary  role 
for  closer  cooperation  as  well  as  further  arrange-
ments with  Russia,  Ukraine  and  other transatlantic 
partners. 
According to the PCA  between the EU  and  Russia, 
the European  Council  adopted a common strate-
gy  on  Russia  (1 7)  in  May  1999. It was  stated that 
the fight against  EE-OC  (1 8)  is  an  obvious  priority. 
The  European Council  had  already decided on the 
common  strategy  of  the  EU  on  Russia  (1 9)  and 
proposed  to  set  up  an  action  plan  on  common 
action with  Russia  to fight OC  (2°). 
(1 5)  EU  Commissioner  responsible  for  external  affairs,  Hans 
van  den  Broek,  Moscow,  9 and  10 July  1998. 
(1 6)  Document  6611/00  Crimorg  36,  The  prevention  and 
control of OC-A European strategy for the beginning of 
the new millennium,  Brussels,  3 March  2000. 
(1 7)  EU-Russia common strategy,  document 7073/5/99 REV 
5 PESC  72  COEST  9. 
(1 8)  Including  actions  to  fight  corruption,  money  laundering, 
trafficking  in  drugs  and  human  beings,  and  illegal  immi-
gration. 
(1 9)  During the conference  in  Cologne  held  on  3 and  4 June 
1999. 
(2°)  Document 6698/00 Crimorg 39 NIS  34. Besides  confirming cooperation  in  judicial  matters 
and in other areas, the action plan states that steps 
will  be taken  by the  Union to promote the devel-
opment of cooperation  with  Russian  law  enforce-
ment authorities. 
To further develop cooperation between the Mem-
ber  States'  liaison  officers  in  Russia,  the  Union 
seeks to ensure that these officers meet on  a reg-
ular basis. As  provided for in the EU  common strat-
egy  on  Russia,  cooperation  between  Europol  and 
the competent Russian  agencies will be developed 
in  accordance with the Europol  Convention. 
In this respect, the EU-Russia Conference on  Or-
ganised Crime (2
1
), held on  15 and  16 December 
1999 in  Helsinki,  was  of particular importance.  In 
(2
1
)  Document 5014/00 Crimorg  1 NIS  1. 
parallel with this conference, a practitioner's forum 
was  conducted.  The  forum  discussed  in  detail  the 
abovementioned  draft  EU-Russia  action  plan  and 
aimed at strengthening and  enhancing the content 
of the draft plan from a perspective of practical  law 
enforcement cooperation. 
The  implementation  of  the  current  and  future 
guidelines must certainly be done in very close co-
operation  with  Europol.  Among other possibilities, 
data  could  be  exchanged  on  the  general  criminal 
situation in  the EU  and  Russia, inter alia  for use  in 
the  preparation  of the  EU's  OC  situation  report. 
Europol  should  be  mentioned  where  appropriate 
as  a supporting  European  body  especially  in  the 
activities  under the title 'Law enforcement cooper-
ation' of the action  plan  on  Russia. 
11 3. Brief general 
situation report 
3.1. East European 
perspectives 
In  1998 and  1999, the heads of the CIS  countries 
and the Baltic States discussed at their annual con-
ferences  measures  to  combat  EE-OC,  particularly 
in relation to groups involved in  money laundering, 
drug trafficking, kidnapping and arms smuggling, as 
well  as  attempts  by  wealthy  EE-OC  members  to 
penetrate politics  (22). 
3.1.1. Russia  (past) 
Vladimir Selivanov,  head  of the Russian  Ministry of 
the  Interior's  OC  Division,  reported  on  21  July 
1998 that Russian  criminal groups had  successful-
ly  penetrated  the  Russian  Government.  Their 
members were serving as  elected  officials on  local 
and  national  levels.  Furthermore,  he  stated  that 
about 9 000 criminal groups were at that time op-
erating across  Russia.  These  groups  have  demon-
strated  that they  possess  impressively  sophisticat-
ed weaponry and technological equipment, as well 
as  a deep  knowledge  of  money-laundering tech-
niques and  illicit financial  dealing. 
At the beginning of 1998, the Ministry for the Inte-
rior  stated  that the number of reported  crimes  for 
1997  (2.39  million)  was  down  by  8.7 Ofo  (23). 
However, already in  1998 this trend  had  swung to 
the  other  extreme,  with  a  total  number  of 2.58 
million.  Besides the official  statistics, the real  num-
ber  of crimes  was  closer to  8.5  million  according 
(22)  Annual  conference of heads  of the CIS  and  Baltic States' 
organised  crime departments, Moscow,  Russia,  6 to 9 Ju-
ly  1998.  Several  police  attaches  of  EU  Member  States 
and  other countries  accredited  in  Moscow attended  the 
conference as  observers. 
(23)  More than  60 %  of these crimes were serious. 
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to the General  Prosecutor's office.  In  1997,  prose-
cutors encountered more than 50 000 known cas-
es  in  which detectives either refused  to register or 
investigate hard-to-solve crimes  (24). 
Of particular note is the development of the num-
ber  of drug-related  crimes.  From  1990 to  1999, 
drug offences increased by more than  1 200 Ofo.  In 
fact,  compared  with  16  255  drug  offences  that 
were  registered  in  1990,  their  number  rose  to 
216 364 in  1999. The  most spectacular yearly in-
creases  were  recorded  in  1993 and  1997 (25). In 
that year,  the  new criminal  code  came  into  effect 
and  a new drug law was  elaborated  in  parliament 
and  subsequently  signed  by the  president in  De-
cember.  The  growth of drug offences thus reflects 
not only the  spread  of drug trade  and  consump-
tion,  but also  the  increasing  attention  to the phe-
nomenon  paid  by  Russian  law  enforcement 
authorities and the media. 
(24)  In  1997,  a study  of the  Saint  Petersburg  police  revealed 
that more than  600 crimes including 20 murders (in one 
case  the police found parts of a mutilated body) and  30 
armed robberies were committed in the city but were not 
registered. 
(25)  It  is  necessary to  point out that these  statistical  data  in-
clude only the reports  made by the Ministry of the Interi-
or.  Penal  proceedings initiated  by other investigative bod-
ies,  such  as the Russian  Federal  Border Service  (FSB, the 
former KGB),  are  not included. Russian  crime statistic 
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216 364 
In  general,  official figures  indicate an  upward trend 
in  Russian  crime.  From  1997 to  1999, the official 
overall  crime  rates  in  Russia  showed  a small  but 
constant increase.  In  addition,  corporate  crime  ac-
cordingly rose and was largely unreported. It has to 
be  taken  into  account  that,  according  to  the  last 
available  figures,  2  million  people  out  of a total 
Russian  population  of  147  million  regularly  use 
drugs including a quarter of a million registered ad-
dicts.  These  figures  have  shown  a  threefold  in-
crease  over the past five  or six years. 
According  to the  Russian  figures,  the  average  de-
tection  rate  was  more than  72  o;o  (26). The  opti-
mistic statistics provided by the Russian  police look 
more than  doubtful when compared with  an  aver-
age  disclosure  rate  of  less  than  40  °/o  by  most 
western  police  forces.  Experts  claim  that  hard-to-
solve  crimes  such  as  burglaries  and  economic 
crimes are  left out of the official  statistics. 
The  former Interior Minister,  Sergei  Stepashin,  and 
Yuri  Skuratov,  the  Prosecutor-General  at that time, 
have publicly called on the police to stop doctoring 
the  statistics.  Russia  established  a  new  statistical 
system  in  late  1998 (27). However,  official  Russian 
(26
)  Moscow's  Prosecutor,  Sergey  Gerasimov,  claimed  that in 
the first half of 1998 even 86% of crimes had been solved. 
(27)  Moscow Times,  9 July  1998. 
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figures  certainly  underestimate  the  extent  of  In-
volvement of organised  criminal  groups. 
3.1.2. Russia  (present) 
With  regard  to the upward trend detected in  Russ-
ian  criminality,  noteworthy of mention  are  the  re-
sults  offered  by the  Netherlands.  In  particular,  this 
Member  State  has  pointed  out  that  various  im-
provements  in  the  Russian  situation  between 
1997 and  1998 give  reason  to  believe in  a possi-
ble  pause  in  OC  escalation. The  reasons  indicated 
for the optimistic forecast are a higher level  of sta-
bilisation,  progress  in  tax  collection  and  a  major 
balance  in  trade with the west. 
Although  these factors  are  without doubt promis-
ing  aspects,  it  must,  in  turn,  be  duly  recognised 
that such  improvements are  probably not enough 
to  influence  positively the  OC  problem,  which  is 
also a result of deeper political, social and cultural 
difficulties that the country is facing.  However, sig-
nificant  improvements  in  the fight against  OC  in 
Russia  can  be  achieved  through the  introduction 
of  effective  law  enforcement  legislation  against 
crimes  (such  as  money  laundering)  that  repre-
sent  the  most  crucial  areas  of  interest  for  OC 
groups. 
Appropriate  attention  should  nonetheless  be 
given to recent statistics that according to  Russian 
authorities  appear  to  show  an  improvement  in 
the  general  crime  situation  within  Russia.  Of 
course,  it  is  still  too  early  to  evaluate  the  signifi-
cance  of these  statistics  or  the  factors  that  may 
have  had  an  influence  on  them.  Any  attempt to 
foresee  the  future  developments  related  to  the 
EE-OC  situation  is  also  inappropriate at this  stage 
due to  the  incomplete  nature  of the  current  sta-
tistics  and  the  absence  of supporting  data  from 
other sources. 
As  just  mentioned,  according  to  Russian  authori-
ties  (28), an  overall  improvement in the crime situ-
ation was  recorded  in the first eight months of this 
year.  The  crime  statistics  from  January  to  August 
2000  expressed  the  following  decreases  com-
pared  to the same  period of the preceding year: 
reported crimes (- 2.2  OJo); 
(2
8
)  Statistics  presented  by the Russian  delegation  during the 
third  meeting of the EU-Russia  Subcommittee, Moscow, 
5 and  6 October 2000. number of serious crimes (- 8.3  OJo)  and their 
proportion within the total amount of reported 
crimes(- 0.9  Ofo); 
number of murders (- 2.5  Ofo); 
thefts  (- 9.7  Ofo),  robberies  (- 8.9  OJo)  and 
armed  robberies (- 9.7 Ofo). 
The  positive  trend  was  explained  as  dependent 
on both a certain  stabilisation of the socio-political 
and economic situation and  an  active involvement 
of law  enforcement bodies  in  crime  control  and 
public  order  protection.  The  following  improve-
ments  in  the fight  against  organised  crime  were 
indicated: 
exposure  of leaders  and  active  members  of 
organised  criminal  groups  in  commission  of 
serious  crimes(+  11  Ofo); 
suppression  of 43  contract murders and  318 
gangster assaults; 
detection of economic crimes  (  +  67 Ofo); 
exposure  of criminal  attempts  in  the financial 
and  credit area  (  +  37.5  Ofo); 
exposure  of crimes  related  to  the  consumer 
market (  +  39 Ofo); 
suppression  of crimes in  the foreign  econom-
ic area  (+ 27.6 Ofo); 
exposure  of  privatisation-related  offences 
(  + 25.3 Ofo); 
detected  criminal  violations  against  public 
service  and  self-government  service  interests 
(  + 1  8. 1 Ofo); 
suppressed  bribery cases(+ 0.7  Ofo); 
exposure  of crimes  related  to  traffic  of illegal 
drugs,  psychotropic  and  highly  potent  sub-
stances,  more than  one  third  of which  were 
serious or very serious  (  +  15.1  Ofo). 
The  positive  indications were,  however,  accompa-
nied  by  a generalised  rise  in  crime  in  28 regions, 
as  well  as  a reported  increase  in: 
serious or very serious crimes related to traffic 
of illegal drugs, psychotropic and  highly potent 
substances  (  +  8.7  Ofo); 
criminal  violations  against  life  and  limb 
(  + 5.4 °/o). 
3.1.3. Ukraine 
It should  be  noted that,  in  reality,  it is  very difficult 
to  distinguis~ between,  for  example,  Russian  and 
Ukrainian  groups,  without  actually  establishing 
points of individual origin. 
OC  in  the Odessa  region  is  based  around the port 
with  an  estimated  6  000  participants  (29).  The 
criminal  groups from  this  region  have  strong  links 
with  the  Brighton  Beach  area  of New York,  which 
has  for  some  time  been  a focus  of  US  law  en-
forcement efforts against EE-OC.  Due to the lack of 
border controls, the Odessa  area  is  particularly no-
torious for trafficking drugs produced in  south-west 
and  central  Asia  destined for Europe. 
In  February  1999, Mykola  Dzhyha, Vice-Minister for 
Internal  Affairs,  at  a news  conference,  announced 
the  presence  of 200 criminal  gangs  operating  in 
Ukraine.  Of these,  49 had  an  ethnic base.  Official 
statistics  indicate that in  1998 over  1 157 criminal 
groups  with  4  856  members  were  disbanded. 
They  were  responsible  for  9  000 crimes  that  in-
cluded  127 killings,  670 assaults,  468 cases  of ex-
tortion  and  648 cases  of theft of State  and  com-
munal property.  Most of the groups were connect-
ed  with local  government structures. These groups 
had their own punishment sections; the police un-
covered  13  punishment  cells  run  by  criminal 
groups in  Sevastopol. These cells  were used  to in-
flict torture on  sellers to force them to pay  protec-
tion  money. 
In  November  1998,  the  Russian  Interior  Minister 
stated that 'Budapest was  the headquarters of the 
EE-OC originating from Russia  and  Ukraine'.  In  Feb-
ruary  1999,  the  prolonged  presence  in  Budapest 
of Semion  Vukovich  Mogilevich  (3°)  continued  to 
cause embarrassment to the Hungarian authorities. 
In  August  1999,  Mogilevich,  born  in  Ukraine,  was 
(29)  Based  on  declassified  Federal  Bureau  of  Investigation 
(FBI)  information. 
(3°)  Further  information  about Mogilevich  is  given  in  Chapter 
4 'Financial  crime'. 
15 linked to a new financial  scandal,  this time involv-
ing the  Bank  of New York  and  a company known 
as Benex. According to a report in March  1999, the 
Slovak Interior Minister,  Ladislav  Pittner,  stated  that 
EE-OC,  originating in  Ukraine,  was  penetrating Slo-
vakia.  This  followed  the  killings  of several  Slovak 
criminals, believed to be the victims of an  attempt-
ed  takeover by EE-OC  groups. 
3.1.4. Moldova 
Moldova  is  the  smallest  republic  of the  FSU  and 
since its independence has suffered a civil war,  po-
litical  unrest  and  economic  turmoil  - the  classic 
'breeding ground' of organised  crime. 
Although  Moldova seems to maintain  a low threat 
profile  in  comparison  with  the  remainder  of the 
EE-OC emanating from the FSU,  it was  mentioned 
by  Spain  in  last year's  European  organised crime 
situation  report  in  relation  to  police  operations 
concluded  against  criminal  organisations.  Specifi-
cally,  a few Moldovan  nationals were  members of 
criminal  organisations that allegedly committed vi-
olent  crimes  as  well  as  economic  and  financial 
cr1mes. 
Nonetheless,  there  is  significant  anecdotal  evi-
dence  that  Moldova's  eastern  border  is  used  to 
tranship  all  types  of  contraband,  including  nar-
cotics.  Intermittent  seizures  by  Moldovan  officials 
indicate that the country is  a transit route for hero-
in  and cocaine moving from central Asia  to Europe 
and  precursor  chemicals  moving  in  the  opposite 
direction. 
Furthermore,  there  are  indications  that  extremely 
favourable  money-laundering  conditions  exist  in 
Moldova,  and  investigations  confirm  that such  ac-
tivity  has  taken  place.  The  activities  of  EE-OC  in 
many sectors of the economy and the high level of 
official  corruption  suggest  a  high  prevalence  of 
money-laundering activity.  Several  Moldovan banks 
have regularly exported  large  amounts of bulk cur-
rency whose volume was  not correlated  to or jus-
tified by business transactions. 
3.2. Global impacts 
There can  be no doubt that EE-OC groups do have 
a global  impact.  However,  it is  evident from sever-
al  Member  States  that  the  real  nature  of  EE-OC 
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and  its  impact on  the EU  are  still  unclear.  Despite 
the  fact  that there  is  a great  deal  of information 
concerning  their  activities,  significant  intelligence 
gaps  remain  concerning the structures  involved  in 
EE-OC  groups. 
Russian  authorities  believe  that  EE-OC  gangs  are 
active  in  the territories  of more than  40 countries 
worldwide,  for  example  in  Germany,  Israel,  Italy, 
the Netherlands,  Switzerland,  Turkey  and  the Unit-
ed  States  (3 1).  An  issue  of increasing· concern  is 
the infiltration of EE-OC groups into the PAS.  Once 
these  States  are  fully-fledged  members of the EU, 
those criminal  groups will  have  the opportunity to 
operate  at  the  heart  of the  Community while  al-
ready having a stable operating base. The extent of 
crime  in  east  European  countries  is  a  matter  of 
particular concern. This  continuing phenomenon is 
referred  to by  several  commentators as  the 'crimi-
nal-political nexus'. The  best proponent of this par-
adigm  (32)  is  Professor  Louise  Shelley  (33),  and 
can  be shown as  follows: 
Crime 
Bribery 
Corruption 
Partiality 
Business 
~Fraud~ 
Smuggling 
Money laundering 
Protection rackets 
Front companies 
RUSSIA'S CRIMINAL-
POLITICAL NEXUS 
~ 
State 
Bribery 
Economic espionage 
Cronyism 
Monopoly 
Protection 
Source:  Professor Louise  Shelley. 
(3 1)  Vladimir  Strashkov,  Russian  First  Deputy  Officer  for  For-
eign Affairs,  International Conference of Politicians and  Ex-
perts from  Germany,  Russia  and the United  States,  5 and 
6 June  1998. 
(32)  In this  context,  paradigm  means a model of activity. 
(33)  Professor  Louise  Shelley  is  the  Director of the  Center for 
the  Study  of Transnational  Organised  Crime  and  Corrup-
tion at the American  University, Washington  D.C.  Her pub-
lished  works  include  Post  Soviet  organised  crime  - A 
new  form  of  authoritarianism,  The  crimina/-pofiticaf 
nexus: A Russian  case  study,  and  Organised crime  and 
corruption  in  Ukraine: Impediments to  the  development 
of a free  market economy. The  conditions  created  by  this  'criminal-political 
nexus'  (such  as  widespread  corruption,  social 
problems  and  economic  breakdown)  clearly 
demonstrate  the  environment  in  which  EE-OC 
groups  have  the opportunity to thrive  and  project 
their power and  influence to the wider world. 
Another  issue  that  is  perhaps  unique  to  EE-OC 
groups concerns the actual  activities,  structure and 
extent  of the  criminal  networks  involved.  Several 
Member States  make  specific  reference  to  having 
members of EE-OC  groups  active  and/or resident 
on  their territory.  These  groups  are  actually based 
on  ad  hoc  associations  between  criminals  who 
share  some common link to perhaps geographical 
areas within the FSU.  However, these networks are 
volatile and  may disintegrate very quickly. 
Further  research  carried  out in  Italy  has  also  pro-
vided information on the actual modus operandi of 
EE-OC groups active in the country. Again,  it seems 
fair  to  say  that these  generic  characteristics  could 
be applied to the targeting of EE-OC across the EU. 
EE-OC  in  Italy  (34)  has  demonstrated to specialise 
in  money  laundering,  drug  supply  and  arms  traf-
ficking,  as  well  as  a widespread  economic impact 
and  capability  of  utilising  independent  criminal 
structures based on violence and corruption. Other 
characteristics  are  control  over  natural  resources, 
political  influence  and  international  links  to  other 
OC  groups.  They  are  known  for making extensive 
use  of  Israeli  identity  papers  and  false  bank  ac-
counts. The  most affected areas  in  Italy have been 
the  central  Adriatic  provinces  where  the  local 
economy has  suffered  undeniable consequences. 
Over the  past  few years,  the  wealth  of EE-OC  in 
Italy has  increased, particularly through an  increase 
in  the  tourism  industry.  Prostitutes,  goods  and 
money have  been  moved in  and  out of the coun-
try through tourist companies.  So-called  'shopping 
tours'  have  been  organised  in  Adriatic  resorts  and 
have  provided  ready  cash  turnover  for  EE-OC 
groups in the region. Travel  agencies set up by  EE-
OC  groups  in  Russia  are  used  to  facilitate  these 
trips.  It  has  been  revealed  that EE-OC  groups em-
ploy  specific  infiltration  tactics  to  gain  Italian  citi-
zenship. 
Alliances  have  been  formed with  local  OC  groups 
and  informants  have  spoken  about  specific  con-
(34)  Based  on  research  carried  out by the Italian  Interior Min-
istry and the University of Milan. 
tacts  between  Cosa  Nostra  and  EE-OC  criminals. 
However,  EE-OC  groups  seem  to  steer  clear  of 
those  crime  areas  normally associated  with  Italian 
OC  activities  or  territories.  Investigations  have  re-
vealed  that  both  the  Solntsevskoyo  and  the  ls-
moilovskoyo  crime  syndicates  are  active  in  Italy, 
specifically in the Greater Rome,  Greater Milan and 
Adriatic areas. 
Although  the  groups  keep  a  low  profile  and  are 
very careful  about their criminal  activities,  they are 
involved  in  the following main activities: 
trafficking of arms, explosives and nuclear ma-
terial; 
trafficking of women for prostitution; 
counterfeiting of US  dollars; 
production of forged  documents; 
theft and  trafficking of art and  antiquities. 
Many other countries are  assessed  as  being affect-
ed  by  EE-OC.  The  following countries  are  of spe-
cific interest. 
Cyprus: This is a favourite location for money laun-
dering as well as a final destination for illegal  Russ-
ian  capital,  estimated  at  USD  1.3  billion  arriving 
every month. The  problem here is that Cypriot au-
thorities  have  refused  to cooperate with the Russ-
ian  Central  Bank  on  the  matter  of  licences  for 
Russian  companies to operate. In Cyprus, there are 
a  myriad  of offshore  bank  accounts  for  Russians 
where  capital  is  safe  from  inflation,  low  interest 
rates  and,  of  course,  the  unstable  rouble.  The 
country is  also  a way station for money going into 
the London property market. 
Switzerland:  Since this  is  a major business centre 
for  Russians,  no  overt  criminal  activity  normally 
takes  place.  Nevertheless,  they  do  engage  in  ex-
tensive money laundering and  have  overtaken  the 
Colombians in  the amounts involved. The  amount 
of registered  money has reached  USD 4 billion an-
nually.  Extortion  cases  in  Russia  have  usually  de-
manded that resulting payments be made to Swiss 
bank accounts. 
In  the recent  past,  several  other events  have  con-
tributed to define better the activities, structure and 
extent of EE-OC. 
17 The  consolidation  of Chechen  OC  groups  in 
Moscow  and  Chechnya.  However,  these 
groups  have  been  put under severe  pressure 
due  to  the  Russian  military  campaign  in 
Chechnya. 
Extensive official reports of EE-OC-related crime 
and  offenders  by  law  enforcement authorities 
in  Estonia,  central  Asia,  Hungary,  Saint  Peters-
burg,  Tambov,  Ukraine,  Vladivostock,  the 
Czech  Republic, Florida, the Caribbean Islands, 
Israel,  Switzerland  (including the unsuccessful 
trial  of Sergei  Mikhailov),  Latvia  and  Georgia. 
The  involvement  of  EE-OC  in  the  sporting 
world, including participation in  gambling rings 
and attempts to influence key events in  major 
sports,  such  as  ice  hockey  and  football,  in 
both  Europe and  North America. 
3.2.1. Potential extent of EE-OC 
interests (35) 
A recent  episode  serves  as  an  example  of EE-OC 
interest in the sporting world and  also  gives  an  in-
dication of the potential scale  and  impact of its  in-
fluence on  various areas  of society in  general. 
Just a few days before the opening of the Sydney 
Olympic Games,  Gafur  Rakhimov,  from  Tashkent 
in  Uzbekistan,  was  banned  from  entering  Aus-
tralia  for  his  alleged  links  to  the  Russian  Mafiya 
and  to  drug  dealing.  Besides  being  very  rich, 
Rakhimov  is  a member of the International Ama-
teur  Boxing  Association's  (AlBA)  Executive  Com-
mittee and  one of the world's most senior boxing 
administrators. 
Rakhimov also  has  a number of business  interests 
in the west, including in the UK.  He is  known to be 
a long-time associate and friend of other high-rank-
ing officials  in  the international  boxing community 
who were  helping coordinate  the  Olympic  boxing 
bouts. 
The  FBI  started  to keep  an  eye  on  Rakhimov's  ac-
tivities  in  1995.  His  name  is  said  to  appear  in  a 
federal  file  entitled  ,Russian  organised  crime/rack-
eteering  enterprises',  in  which  his  associates  are 
described as  the cream  of the Russian  Mafiya, and 
that alleges  his  involvement in  cocaine trafficking. 
(35)  Sunday Herold,  10 September 2000. 
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The  Moscow  Office  of  the  Chief  Directorate  for 
Fighting  Economic Crime,  the body that took over 
the  KGB's  surveillance  of  Soviet  gangsters,  also 
seems  to  have  opened  a file  on  him. That  report 
apparently states that Rakhimov is one of the lead-
ers  of Uzbek  organised  crime,  as  well  as  a major 
figure  in  an  international  drug  syndicate,  and  his 
main  speciality  is  the  organised  production  of 
drugs  in  central  Asian  countries.  He  is  believed  to 
keep very close connections with Afghan traders in 
drugs. 
The  Olympic incident is  not the first  of its  kind  to 
involve  Rakhimov.  It  seems that during one  of his 
trips  to  Paris  the immigration service  allowed  him 
into  France,  but filed  a report to  the  Interior Min-
istry  describing  him  as  a  mobster  who  posed  a 
danger  to  public  safety.  In  another  attempt  he 
made to enter the  country,  French  police tore  up 
his  visa  and  put  him  on  his  private  jet  back  to 
Tashkent. 
The  jet's pilot was  Andre Guelfi,  who is  said  to be 
under  investigation  in  France,  Germany  and 
Switzerland  for  his  self-confessed  role  in  launder-
ing USD  40 million. 
There  have  also  been  allegations  that  Rakhimov 
and  his  associates  were  involved  in  bribery  con-
nected  to  elections  for  senior  positions  in  the 
Olympic Boxing Association. 4. Financial crime 
4.1. Financial crime in general 
Due to the serious and well-documented social and 
economic problems existing in the FSU, especially in 
Russia, there is an ongoing movement of criminal fi-
nance from these areas to the Member States. Sev-
eral  national  contributions  make  reference  to  the 
scale  of money-laundering activities  carried  out by 
EE-OC groups.  Detailed modi operandi include the 
use of offshore and front companies, complex fund 
concealment tactics, exploitation of the instability of 
the rouble, misappropriation of aid  money and tak-
ing full  advantage of electronic banking systems  as 
well as sophisticated currency and commodity mar-
kets  in the Member States.  Several  Member States 
report that they are used as transit countries for ille-
gal  funds  from  the  FSU.  These  sophisticated  modi 
operandi  present  severe  problems  to  financial  in-
vestigators targeting criminal finances from the  FSU 
- the  rapid  movement of funds  across  electronic 
national  borders  and  the  rapid  turnover of compa-
nies  and  accounts  make  tracing  the  origin  of the 
funds extremely difficult. An added attraction in sev-
eral  Member  States  is· the  availability  of  property, 
which  is purchased in order to launder illicit funds. 
Links to  specific business  interests  are  mentioned, 
including companies in  Stockholm with  links to OC 
groups from  the  Saint  Petersburg  region,  compan-
ions  in  the  Bahamas  with  connections  to  Austrian 
firms  and  the  YBM  Magnex  scandal  involving  sev-
eral  countries  (particularly Hungary,  Lithuania,  Rus-
Russian economic crime statistics 
January to August  1999 ( 1 000) 
11.1  II Against property 
II Misappropriation and embezzlement 
In the sphere of economic activities 
Against the interest of service in 
commercial and other institutions 
II Others 
Bribery 
Against the State power and the 
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Source: Russian  Ministry of the Interior. 
19 sia,  the  UK  and  the  United  States).  Perhaps  the 
most significant  problem  now facing  law  enforce-
ment  attempts  to  investigate  money  laundering 
from  the  FSU  is  the difficulty in  differentiating be-
tween  actual  illegal  and  what  may  now be  semi-
legitimate funds moving both in  and  out of the EU 
and  the  FSU.  In  addition,  it  seems  clear  that,  al-
though  there  are  many  potential  cases  involving 
money laundering and  EE-OC  groups,  this  is  gen-
erally a symptom of other crime.  The  difficulty lies 
in  allocating resources to both the criminal and the 
financial  activities. 
In  addition,  the  under-invoicing of goods  and  the 
use  of  fraudulent  contracts  to  export  credit  are 
other  enforcement  problems.  Furthermore,  Russ-
ian  banks  have  encountered  serious  difficulties  in 
the  area  of  payment  card  fraud.  In  Russia  more 
than  200 false  cards  (70 Ofo  Visa  cards)  are  confis-
cated  daily with  the annual  damage  amounting to 
several  million dollars. 
4.2. Organised crime 
involvement 
4.2.1. Situation in CIS  countries 
Since  1990, EE-OC  gangsters and  crooked  officials 
have  sent  more  than  USD  300 billion  to  foreign 
bank accounts  (36)  - a sum which  is  greater than 
the total  amount of the post-1990 western  aid. 
According to various sources,  Russia's  economy is 
under the influence of EE-OC  as follows: 
40 000 Russian  businesses and  industrial en-
terprises  (37); 
40 Ofo  of private businesses; 
50-80 o;o  of the Russian  banks; 
60 Ofo  of State-owned companies  (38); 
(36)  Anatoly  Kulikov,  interview in  Obshchaya  gazeta,  No  46, 
Moscow,  March  1997. 
(37)  Anatoly  Kulikov,  former  Interior  Minister,  21  February 
1998. 
(38)  Seventh  session  of the  UN  Commission  for  Crime  Pre-
vention  and  Criminal Justice,  Vienna,  April  1998. 
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70-80  Ofo  of  all  Russian  commercial 
activities  (39). 
The  excessively  large  percentage  of Russian  bank-
ing  business  reported  to  be  under criminal  influ-
ence  is  not based  on the actual  number of institu-
tions,  but on  asset holding and deposit-based ratio 
figures.  These  figures  (period  1996-mid  1997) 
show  that  criminal  ownership  of a comparatively 
few  large-scale  banking  houses  can  obtain  effec-
tive  control  of  significant  segments  of  the  entire 
banking  sector  to  gain  investment  control  of cer-
tain  large  commodities and  natural  resources. 
The  reality  of the Ukrainian  economy is  of partic-
ular  concern.  On  31  July  1998,  Leonid  Kuchma, 
President  of  Ukraine,  claimed  that  the  shadow 
economy  accounted  for  45  °/o  of  the  Ukrainian 
gross national product (GNP). Independent econo-
mists  put this figure  as  high  as  60 Ofo  of the entire 
economy being in the hands of OC. 
Much of the economic troubles and the vulnerabil-
ity to money laundering of Ukraine is a result of its 
currency.  In  1992, in the aftermath of the break-up 
of the  FSU  and  the formation  of the CIS,  Ukraine 
remained  within  the  rouble  zone.  Inflation  rose 
sharply to between 300 and  380 Ofo.  A lack of ad-
equate procedural  machinery to fully enforce strin-
gent  legislation  has  encouraged  criminal  control 
over  the  private  sector,  with  the  growth  of  front 
subsidiary companies specifically established to cir-
cumvent the  legislation  and  facilitate  capital  flight 
and  tax  evasion.  An  estimated  USD  15  billion  to 
USD  20  billion  has  been  illegally  taken  out  of 
Ukraine since  1991  (
40
). 
Moldova's  economic situation  is  hardly better.  Af-
ter it introduced its own national currency in  1993, 
one  of Moldova's  most important economic trou-
bles  was  the  GNP,  which  fell  constantly.  Other 
troubles were its production of goods and services, 
which  dropped to a level  of the  1960s, its foreign 
debts,  which  reached  with  USD  1  .3  billion  more 
than  60 Ofo  of its GNP,  and  its internal debts, which 
reached  the critical  level  of USD  240 million. 
(39)  FBI  Director,  Louis  Freeh,  in  a testimony at  the  US  Con-
gress,  30 April  1998. 
It  is  not  a secret  that a lot of  privatised  enterprises  and 
commercial banks pay for a so-called 'krysha' (that means 
a 'roof'  - the  friendly  term  for  racketeering  money for 
'protection') - usually  10-20 %  of the turnover. 
( 40)  This  is  more than  Ukraine's external  debt. All  these circumstances  put together have  led to a 
grey  economic  sector  that  is  already  involved  in 
about 60 Dfo  of the republic's business. The effects 
are  growing:  economic  crime  rates,  embezzle-
ments of State  property and  capital  flight from the 
country.  Of  particular  note  is  that  extremely 
favourable  money-laundering  conditions  exist  in 
Moldova.  Investigations  confirm  that  such  activity 
does take  place.  The  activities of OC  in  many sec-
tors  of the economy and  the  high  level  of official 
corruption  suggest  a  high  prevalence  of  money-
laundering  activity.  Certain  Moldovan  banks  are 
known  to  regularly  export  large  amounts  of bulk 
currency whose volume is not correlated to, or jus-
tified by,  business transactions. It is not uncommon 
for some institutions to  be  set up for a short peri-
od  and  for the sole purpose of laundering money. 
Such  institutions  are  then  taken  over  or  merged 
under a different name. 
4.2.2. Situation in  other east 
European countries (
41
) 
Organised  crime involvement in  financial  crime  al-
so occurs in other east European countries that are 
strongly  influenced  in  various  aspects  by  the geo-
graphically near CIS. 
The  transition  to  a market  economy in  Lithuania 
since  1990  has  been  accompanied  by  a  rise  in 
criminality.  Drug trafficking,  in  particular,  has virtual-
ly doubled since  1995. Lithuania has also seen the 
development of domestic organised  crime groups, 
operating both at the domestic and  at the interna-
tional  level.  Money  laundering  is  frequently  used 
by these  groups.  Similarly  organised  crime  groups 
abroad  are  known  to  launder money in  Lithuania. 
Thus,  money laundering is  seen  as  a real  threat to 
the  developing  Lithuanian  financial  system,  which 
is  vulnerable  at  the  placement,  layering  and  inte-
gration  stages.  The  Lithuanian  authorities  perceive 
the pressure to be currently on the banking sector, 
but  they  recognise  that,  increasingly,  other  non-
bank  financial  institutions  and  real  estate  will  be-
come more vulnerable. 
Estonia  is  bordered  to the  east  by  Russia  and  to 
the  south  by  Latvia.  Its  extensive  Russian  border 
and  regular  import of  Russian  currency  makes  it 
vulnerable to cash  smuggling and  money launder-
ing.  Its  proximity  to  Russia  and  Scandinavia  also 
(41)  FATF, Annual report  7999-2000,  22 June 2000. 
makes  it  a  transit  country  and  vulnerable  to  the 
trafficking  of drugs.  Crime  is  increasing  in  Estonia. 
In  1999, there was  an  11  Dfo  rise,  mostly in  crimes 
against  property  and  drug  offences.  Organised 
crime groups are  known to operate in  Estonia  and 
include persons  of various  national  origins,  includ-
ing  Russians,  Chechens  and  Azerbaijanis.  These 
groups  are  thought to be  involved  in  drug traffick-
ing, theft,  robbery,  prostitution and traffic in  contra-
band.  Organised  crime groups are  also thought to 
be  involved  in  money laundering - which  is  con-
sidered  principally  to  be  an  external  threat.  The 
banking  sector  is  currently  considered  to  be  the 
most  frequent  money-laundering  target  at  the 
placement stage.  However, the Estonian authorities 
recognise the real  vulnerability of the  160 bureaux 
de change  (all of which are  unsupervised) and the 
130 casinos to cash  money laundering. 
4.2.3. Banking vulnerability 
Since  1992, there have been strong indicators that 
OC  groups  within  Russia  have  engaged  in  large-
scale  infiltration and  control of the banking system. 
Similar  situations  are  reported  for  Moldova  and 
Ukraine. 
Criminal ownership of banks is not unprecedented. 
EE-OC  groups,  however,  have  engaged  in  this 
technique to an  unprecedented level. 
The exact nature and  extent of criminal control are 
subject  to  differing  views.  Official  estimates  (
42
) 
have  placed  between  400 and  900 banks  under 
criminal  control; other estimates  place  the propor-
tion of Russian  banks  under criminal control at be-
tween 70 and  80 Dfo  of banks  in the private sector. 
Moreover,  an  exact  definition of criminal  control  is 
difficult to constitute.  In  some  cases,  members of 
criminal  groups  may  have  secured  places  on  the 
management board  of various  banks  and  become 
full  participants in  all  key decisions of the bank. Al-
ternatively,  they  may  keep  a  comparatively  low 
profile  and  exercise  power by  sheer,  but effective, 
intimidation. 
Irrespective  of the  precise  nature  of criminal  con-
trol,  it  is  of significance  that the  activity  of foreign 
banks  within  Russia  is  severely  restricted.  Of  the 
Russian  banks themselves,  less than  20 of the to-
tal  have foreign capital  affiliations. However, the re-
( 42)  Brassey's,  UK,  1996. 
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suit of this limited and  controlled activity by foreign 
banks  means that criminal  control  of banks  within 
Russia  need  only amount to 3  or 4  of the largest 
banks and  between 20 and  30 of the second size 
banks to achieve  an  effective control  of the entire 
Russian  financial  system. 
Infiltration of the banking system  offers advantages 
to  criminal  groups  due  to  the  nature  of banking 
practice,  including the following aspects. 
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Corruption  in  banking  staff  could  be  com-
bined with  exploitation  of regional  differences 
in  banking  practices.  Reforms  eradicating 
most,  but  not all,  differences  in  the  Russian 
banking systems  have  since been  enacted. 
The  Bank  of  Russia  has  no  supervisory  au-
thority  over  banks  operating  outside  Russia 
that transact  business  with  Russian  residents 
and  businesses.  Such  institutions are  growing 
in  number,  mainly  registered  in  Cyprus  and 
the  Baltic  republics,  and  advertise  freely  in 
Russian  business publications. 
Banks  are  allowed to  maintain  both  nominee 
and  numbered accounts. No requirements ex-
ist  for  the  banks  concerned  to  maintain 
1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999 
records  of either personal  details or organisa-
tions associated  with such  accounts. 
Russian  citizens  and  corporate  businesses 
have  the  right  to  open  foreign  currency  ac-
counts  without  any  limitations  in  banks  li-
censed  by the Bank of Russia. 
Customer  identification  and  monitoring  rules 
exist and  are followed; however, these are es-
sentially  in  place  by  the  institution  itself  for 
sound banking practice.  Russian  banks are not 
considered  part  of the  enforcement  process 
and  any  internal  banking  records  maintained 
on  accounts are  purely for banking purposes. 
Transactions  in  foreign  currencies  require  for-
mal  identification,  usually  a  passport,  but  no 
identification  is  required  for  rouble  transac-
tions,  irrespective of the amount. 
Banks  are  required  to  record  and  report  un-
usual  transactions  and  transactions  over  the 
equivalent of USD  10  000 made  by  Russian 
citizens.  Such  reporting,  however,  is  done  en 
bloc by  1 April  of each  year  (for instance,  in-
dividual  suspicious  transactions  need  not  be 
reported  immediately),  and  such  reports  are made to the tax authorities in accordance with 
legislation on  reporting excess  income. 
The  banks'  counter staff are the first in  line of 
any reporting chain and  are essential  in assist-
ing  in  customer  identification  for  bank-law 
enforcement operational liaison. In the case of 
the  old  State  banking  institutions,  such  staff 
are  long serving and  disciplined, but ill-versed 
as to suspicious transaction  recognition.  In the 
case  of the  newer commercial  banks,  reten-
tion  of the  clients'  accounts  is  of paramount 
importance and  banking staff have this  priori-
ty instilled into their working ethos. 
Banks  are  not required  by  law to develop,  or 
even  inaugurate,  formalised  programmes,  or 
training  of  staff,  against  money  laundering. 
This  is  in  contrast to at  least one  EU  Member 
State,  where  every  financial  institution  must 
have  continuous  staff  training  programmes, 
with  records  kept  of  staff  attendees,  against 
money laundering,  and  which  are  subject  to 
random  inspection.  Lack  of evidence  of such 
training  can  result  in  a  statutory  standstill  of 
business. 
One  of the  mainstay  roles  of  prevention  of 
money  laundering  within  Russia  is  that  as-
sumed by the Central  Bank of Russia.  By issu-
ing  periodic  guidelines  in  the  form  of  open 
letters  to  financial  institutions,  anti-money 
laundering  measures  concerning  suspicious 
transaction  recognition,  reporting  advice  and 
procedures,  preventive  measures and  training 
to a certain  standard are instilled into financial 
institutions. However, the Central  Bank itself is 
not immune to internal  corruption.  Indeed, its 
corrupt  employees  may  themselves  be  in-
volved  in  money-laundering  activities.  In 
1996,  five  cases  of various  types  of banking 
fraud  were discovered,  resulting in  the impris-
onment of five senior employees of the Cen-
tral  Bank.  These  cases  covered  offences such 
as  unlawful granting of loans,  manipulation of 
the interest rates  of the Central  Bank to com-
mercial  banks,  and  blatantly  unlawful  cash 
payments from the Central  Bank of Russia  ac-
counts.  Similar  indicators  of malpractice  also 
appeared  during  the  period  between  late 
1996 and  early  1998 (43). 
( 43)  Centre  for  Strategic  and  Global  Studies  at  the  Russian 
Academy of Science,  Moscow,  1998. 
Cases  of abuse  and  fraud  in  the banking sys-
tem  jumped  in  the  first  quarter  of  1998  by 
15  Ofo  (44). 
A further trend giving cause for concern  is that the 
potential criminal control of banks leads to de facto 
criminal control of economic investment, and possi-
bly  perversion  of  normal  macroeconomic  forces. 
Sources  indicate that,  over a three-year period, the 
wealth  established  by  criminal  groups  within  the 
banking world has permitted these groups to estab-
lish  themselves as  a form  of financial  middlemen. 
Indicators have come to light that, at a rate of com-
mission of 1  0-20 Ofo  of the value of the proposed 
venture, criminal groups can guarantee the involve-
ment of any  particular bank in  any  directed  credit 
venture. Such  commission is  paid  in  cash,  and  de-
posited by the criminal group in another bank, allied 
but not owned  by the  lending bank.  This  ensures 
that the affected part of the banking sector involved 
in the coerced granting of credit actually benefits in 
terms of increased assets. 
Given  such  vulnerability  to  money  laundering, 
compared  to  their  EU  counterparts,  it  would  ap-
pear that the violence which  has  been  inflicted on 
executives in the banking sector since  1992 is due 
to  organised  crime  infiltrating  and  influencing the 
banking  sector.  Public  awareness  of  these  phe-
nomena was  heightened by a national commercial 
banking  stoppage  which  occurred  on  the  day  of 
the  funeral  of  the  murdered  chairman  of 
Rosslekhoz  Bank.  Senior  banking  officials  ex-
pressed  their alarm  and  frustration at the apparent 
ineffectiveness of governmental action. 
4.2.4. Capital flight 
Russia's economy continues to struggle through the 
post-Soviet  transition  towards  a  market  economy. 
The  main  causes  of such  economic difficulties are 
economic crime,  corruption,  the  laundering of the 
proceeds of crime and also large-scale capital flight. 
The origin of the last-mentioned problem is the OC-
controlled shadow economy, which - as  stated  by 
experts- has by now reached 40 Ofo of Russia's en-
tire GNP. The problem is at its worst in some sectors 
and areas (Urals and Siberia). A huge proportion of 
corporate entities transfer up to 80 Ofo  of their for-
eign  currency  abroad  every  month,  according  to 
Nicolay Kovalev, Director of Russia's  FSB. 
(44)  Association  of Russian  Banks,  Moscow, 30 June  1998. 
23 Anatoly  Kulikov,  former Minister for  Internal  Affairs, 
revealed that much of the capital is laundered in off-
shore tax shelters (45). Moreover, he suggested that 
'we need to think seriously about ''amnesty" for crim-
inal money abroad and about its return to Russia'. 
The foreign exchange controls imposed by the Cen-
tral  Bank  since  the  rouble  devaluation  in  August 
1998 have  had  some  success  in  both  improving 
overall  economic performance and  slowing capital 
outflows. However, this is also due to a two-tier sys-
tem,  whereby there  are  two  currency trading  ses-
sions, one for importers and exporters, and one for 
other market participants. The  objective  is  to build 
up foreign  reserves  by  manipulating the exchange 
rate between the two sessions. This two-tier system 
has, in effect, created a dual exchange rate and  is in 
breach  of  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF) 
statutes. Certain restrictions have been laid down by 
the Central Bank; for example, in order further to fa-
cilitate  capital  inflow,  75  o;o  of  all  hard  currency 
earned  by  Russian  exports  must  be  repatriated 
within  seven  days  of receipt.  However,  it  is  antici-
pated  that  the  overall  banking  sector  will  exploit 
loopholes in the exchange restrictions as the Central 
Bank of Russia  eases this policy, allowing roubles to 
find  their  way  onto  the  foreign  exchange  market. 
Given the still  low levels of reserves, this would re-
sult  in  a sharp  fall  in  the value  of the  rouble,  and 
would further facilitate  both  laundering and  capital 
flight with the accompanying fluctuations. 
4.2.5. Money laundering 
Money laundering originating  from  the  east  Euro-
pean  countries  continues  to  be  a  significant  and 
growing concern to the European  members of the 
Financial  Action  Task  Force  (FATF)  (46). 
Although  the  official  estimates  of the  amount  of 
laundered  criminal  funds  vary,  there  is  no  doubt 
about  the  enormous  scale  of  the  problem.  The 
IMF  estimates  that  global  money  laundering 
amounts to between 2 and  5 °/o  of the world's en-
tire GP,  i.e.  USD  500 billion to USD  1.3 trillion (47). 
(45)  Anatoly  Kulikov,  interview  in  Obshchaya  gazeta,  No  46, 
Moscow,  March  1997. 
( 46)  FATF,  Report on  money-laundering  typologies,  1996-97 
and  1998-99, Paris,  12  February  1998 and  10  February 
1999. 
(47)  National Strategic Information Center, Trends in organized 
crime,  Washington, summer 1999. 
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Also  the  1997 annual  police  intelligence  report of 
Switzerland claimed  a massive influx of dirty mon-
ey  (USD  40 billion to USD  50 billion) from organ-
ised  criminal  gangs  in  eastern  Europe.  The  report 
assumes  that Switzerland  is  not used  for the  first 
phase  of  money  laundering,  the  placement,  but 
primarily used for the second and  third phases,  i.e. 
for the phases  of layering and  integration. This  re-
port also notes that the number of visas granted to 
people from the CIS  had  leapt significantly - from 
4 000 in the late  1980s to 70 000 in  1997, which 
is  also  seen  as  an  indicator  of  the  increase  in 
money laundering. 
From  many and various case studies, it can  be stat-
ed  that the  methods  of illicit  capital  transfer  and 
laundering can  be  broken  down into four principal 
modi operandi, simplified as  follows. 
1  .  The  use  and  exploitation  of  unwitting parent 
and  subsidiary companies within Russia,  com-
bined with the initial transfer of sums of mon-
ey  from  the  parent to  the  subsidiary  by false 
documentation.  Then  monies  are  transferred 
from  the  bank  accounts  of the  Russian  sub-
sidiary companies to EU  bank accounts, previ-
ously opened by front companies of the crim-
inal  organisation,  and  then  onto  EU  bank  ac-
counts within a second  EU  country. 
2.  The  use  of  parent  companies  within  Russia 
whose ownership has been acquired by crimi-
nal organisations. The initial transfer of criminal 
monies  is  made  to  subsidiary  companies  by 
false  letters of credit or similar false documen-
tation.  It  is  then  transferred  to different com-
pany  bank  accounts  within  Russia  (the  sub-
sidiary companies are based in differing regions 
of Russia).  At  some  stage,  monies  are  trans-
ferred  back to the bank account(s) of the par-
ent company,  and  then,  in  large  cash  transac-
tions, deposited into the account of a subsidiary 
company.  From  there,  it  is  transferred  to  EU 
bank  accounts.  This  method  exploits  the 
regional differences of banking supervision and 
regulation within the vast Russian Federation. 
3.  The  use  of company accounts  in  an  offshore 
jurisdiction to receive monies from Russia  and 
transfer  monies to a private  account  in  a dif-
ferent  branch  of  the  same  bank  in  an  EU 
country.  The  funds  are  then  transferred  into 
a different private  account of the  same  bank 
in  a  second  EU  country,  this  last  transfer 
occurring within  14  days. 4.  Criminal  organisations  within  Russia  using 
front companies to purchase large amounts of 
raw  materials,  then  reselling and  exporting to 
EU  countries.  This  method  involves  the 
Russian  oil  industry on  an  intensive scale. 
In  both  1 and  2,  legitimate  trading  of good?  for 
monies  is  carried  out  between  the  various  sub-
sidiary  companies.  This  provides  genuine  docu-
mentation  of goods  ordered  and  paid  for  (howev-
er  irrational  the  commercial  prices  charged)  and 
enables  the  parent  company  to  trade  in  those 
goods within  Russia,  thus adding a veneer of legit-
imate trade to what are primarily money-laundering 
organisations. It should be noted that the first three 
methods  require  the  compliant  use  and  exploita-
tion  of banks  and  the  interbanking  system  within 
Russia. 
When  assessing  strategically  the  organised  cnml-
nality emanating from  Russia,  there  is  a tendency 
to overemphasise the Russian-European interface, 
to  the  detriment  of  the  implications  of  the 
Russian-Asian dimension. The frontier is far longer 
than  that  of Russia's  border  with  central  Europe, 
and traditionally the Russian/FSU  military, econom-
ic  and  criminal  considerations  in  this  strategic  di-
rection  have  always  been  of  higher  priority  than 
those towards western  Europe. This trend is partic-
ularly appropriate regarding money laundering and 
criminal funds considering the following. 
Asian  economies  are  extremely  cash-
intensive,  with  few,  if  any,  mechanisms  1n 
place to track large  cash  transactions. 
Drug trafficking  has  been  identified  as  one of 
the principal sources of illegal  proceeds in the 
Asian  region. The  other primary source of ille-
gal wealth  is  financial  crime. 
Since  1992, there have  been  strategic indica-
tors  that  Russian  criminal  enterprises  are  ex-
tending into east  and  south-east Asian  enter-
prises  involving  prostitution.  Such  criminality 
invariably  involves  the  necessity  to  launder 
criminal  proceeds,  and  there  are  already  re-
ports  of Russian  criminal  investment in  prop-
erty development and  gambling operations. 
The  banking  systems  of all  CIS  central  Asian 
republics,  linked  to  Moscow  for  generations, 
are in their formative stages and vulnerable to 
economic crime. 
4.2.6. Anti-money laundering 
measures in  Russia  (48) 
The  FATF  report on  non-cooperative countries and 
territories  in  the  international  fight  against  money 
laundering identifies Russia  as one of the  15 coun-
tries  or territories which are viewed by the  FATF  as 
non-cooperative  in  the  fight  against  money laun-
dering. 
Russia  faces  many  obstacles  in  meeting  interna-
tional  standards  for the  prevention,  detection  and 
prosecution  of money laundering. The  report indi-
cates  the  lack  of  comprehensive  anti-money 
laundering laws and  implementing regulations that 
meet international standards as  Russia's  most criti-
cal  barriers  to  improving  its  money-laundering 
regime.  In  particular,  Russia  lacks  comprehensive 
customer identification  requirements,  a suspicious 
transaction  reporting  system,  a fully operational  fi-
nancial  investigative  unit  (FlU)  with  adequate  re-
sources,  and  effective  and  timely  procedures  for 
providing  evidence  to  assist  in  foreign  money 
laundering prosecutions. 
The existence of continued large-scale capital flight, 
underdeveloped market institutions and  lack of fis-
cal  resources  additionally  complicate  the  fight 
against money laundering. 
In  conclusion, the  FATF  has  recommended that fi-
nancial  institutions should give special  attention to 
business  relations  and  transactions  with  persons, 
including companies and financial institutions, from 
the  'non-cooperative  countries  and  territories', 
amongst  which  Russia  is  included.  Furthermore, 
the  FATF  has  stated  that should those countries or 
territories  identified  as  non-cooperative  maintain 
their detrimental  rules  and  practices,  despite  hav-
ing been encouraged to make certain  reforms, the 
adoption of countermeasures should then be con-
sidered  by its  members. 
4.3. Criminal funds  in  Russia 
impacting on the  EU 
Crimes  involving organised  physical  violence  such 
as  large-scale  extortion, vice,  including widespread 
illegal  immigration for purposes of prostitution, and 
drug trafficking  are  impacting severely  on  the  EU. 
(48)  FATF, Annual report  1999-2000, 22 June 2000. 
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within Russia  is  economic crime. 
In  assessing  the  problem  of  organised  crime  in 
Russia,  the following aspects  regarding  large-scale 
criminal sums must be stressed. 
1.  In  1995, Russian  sources cited that 72.2 o;o  of 
all  criminal  offences  registered  in  Russia  over 
the  previous  12  months  were  economic 
crimes. This caused, at a conservative estimate, 
a loss of revenue in excess of USD 4 billion. OC 
groups  perpetrated  36.4  o;o  of the  economic 
crimes. The long-term effects of this on the EU 
will be less apparent - and certainly less spec-
tacular- than those other crime categories, but 
they will have greater adverse strategic conse-
quencesinthelongterm. 
2.  The  essential  nature  of capital  flight.  In  basic 
terms,  this  is  large-scale  asset  transfer,  or tax 
evasion,  which  results  in  much-needed work-
ing  capital  being  illicitly transferred  from  Rus-
sia  to foreign  banks,  primarily in  the  EU.  The 
economic effects of this cannot be understat-
ed. As  early as  1991-92, Russian  sources  es-
timated  that  up  to  20 o;o  of the  Russian  na-
tional  income  was  lost  due  to  illicit  transfer 
abroad.  During the same  period,  every fourth 
US  dollar earned in  exported goods from Rus-
sia  remained in a foreign  bank,  unavailable as 
working  capital  to the  Russian  economy.  The 
difficulty  is  compounded  by the fact  that the 
transfer of individual or corporate assets  is  not 
a comparable offence under collective EU  law, 
or  indeed  within  many  individual  Member 
States. 
3.  Mention  has  been  made  of the  difficulty  in 
distinguishing  essentially  criminal  and  illicitly 
transferred capital funds,  originating from  Rus-
sia,  into the  EU.  Up  to  the  end  of 1994,  EU 
law  enforcement  experts  reported  that  large 
volumes  of  cash  were  arriving  from  central 
and  east  European  nations  into  Member 
States'  banks  and  financial  institutions.  Such 
reports, accompanied by frustration and suspi-
cions that the sums were criminal  monies, re-
mained  unconfirmed. 
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Not much seems to have changed since then, 
considering  that  money  continues  to  move 
out of Russia  on a large scale.  Russian  officials 
estimate that some USD  1.5 billion to USD  2 
billion leaves the country monthly. Most is  not 
derived  from  criminal  act1v1t1es  but  rather  is 
sent  abroad  to  avoid  taxation  and  the  coun-
try's  economic instability.  Still,  Russian  officials 
say  that  criminal  activity  may  account  for 
about one third of the capital  flight (49). 
4.  There  is  much  publicity  regarding  laundering 
and  capital  flight  out  of  Russia.  Since  late 
1994, a corollary trend  has  occurred  whereby 
large-scale  transfers  from  abroad  have  en-
tered Russian  banks.  In  one year, this amount-
ed  to USD  20 billion; this  is  the equivalent of 
10  Dfo  of all  US  cash  holdings  held  abroad. 
The  majority of such  transfers  were  made  in 
the  form  of  low-denomination  notes  (USD 
10,  USD 20 or USD 50); intelligence indicates 
that  a significant  proportion  of the total  sum 
was  in  the  possession  of  Russian  criminal 
groups, which were laundering it on  behalf of 
other foreign-based  criminal  groups. 
5.  The  nature of economic crime does not in  it-
self entail  related  violence  abroad.  The  sheer 
amount of criminal  monies  involved  and  the 
methods of laundering,  however,  have  result-
ed  in  certain  violent  effects  in  EU  Member 
States. 
4.4. The  Bank of New York 
crisis  (50) 
...,  In  terms of dimension, the 
Bank  of New York  crisis  is 
the  biggest  affair  we  have 
seen  up to now.  British  au-
thorities,  investigating  the 
financial activities of EE-OC 
activity,  alerted  the  FBI  to 
the suspected  illicit financial  activities  at  the  Bank 
of New York  more than a year earlier. 
There  were  3  500 pages  of transactions  for  one 
account in  the name of Benex,  a company run  by 
a Russian.  Investigators found references to Benex, 
which  was  linked  to  YBM  Magnex,  an  industrial 
( 49)  Statement  by  the  director  of  the  Central  Intelligence 
Agency  (CIA)  addressed to the Senate  Select Committee 
on  Intelligence, 2  February 2000. 
( 50)  International Currency Review,  Volume 25, No 3,  London, 
October  1999. magnet-maker based in  Newton, Pennsylvania, op-
erating  as  a  money  laundering  front  for  Mogile-
vich  (51). 
'Once, 1  accidentally washed USD  5 l 
I'd left in  a shirt pocket.  I must say 
they looked a lot cleaner after that: 
Semyon  Yukovich  Mogi/evich  I  c._______  ---------
In  June  1999, YBM  Magnex pleaded  guilty  in  the 
Federal  District Court in  Philadelphia to one count 
of conspiracy to commit securities  and  mail fraud. 
The  Bank  of New  York  responded  to  the  abrupt 
emergence of this scandal  into the public spotlight 
by suspending two Russian  employees. Both  w~r~ 
senior officers with the bank's  East  European  DIVI-
sion  and  are  married  to  Russian  'businessmen'. 
One of the two employees was  Natasha  Gurfinkel 
Kagalovsky.  A few years  ago,  Ms  Gurfinkel  married 
Konstantin  Kagalovsky,  a former economic adviser 
to the Russian  Government.  Kagalovsky's  appoint-
ment as vice-president of the second largest Russ-
ian  oil firm, YUKOS  Oil,  included close connections 
with  Eurobank  - Banque  commerciale  pour 
!'Europe  du  Nord,  78  Ofo  owned  by  the  Central 
Bank  of Russia.  Eurobank was  at the centre of in-
vestigations  regarding  the  laundering  of USD  1.4 
billion to USD  50 billion through accounts held by 
Fimaco, a Jersey-based offshore company, which is 
wholly  managed  and  controlled  by  Eurobank  out 
of its  offices in  France. 
4.4.1. Developments in the Bank 
of New York investigations (52) 
The  latest  developments  regarding  the  Bank  of 
New York  investigations  give  a fairly  clear  idea  of 
the complexity and  scale of financial crime in  east-
ern  Europe,  the  involvement  of  organised  crime 
groups  and  the  links  to  high-level  political  and 
business circles. 
(51)  Mogilevich, known as the 'Red  Don',  is suspected of earn-
ing  billions  through  arms  dealing,  prostitution,  art  fraud 
and  extortion.  British  investigators  say  his  empire stretch-
es  through  central  Europe  to  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
Channel  Islands and the United States.  Estimates claimed 
that  more than  USD  4.2  billion  passed  through  one  ac-
count  in  more than  1  0  000 transactions  between  Octo-
ber  1998 and  March  1999. 
(52)  Wall  Street Journal,  Dow  Jones  News  Service  and  The 
New  York  Times  News  Service  ( 14  and  15  September 
2000). 
After  about two years  of investigating  the  move-
ment  of  billions  of  dollars  through  the  Bank  of 
New  York,  US  federal  law  enforcement  officials 
stated  that  much  of the money involved tax  eva-
sion  by  Russian  businesses.  Furthermore,  the  in-
vestigators  offered  to  help  Moscow  if  Russia 
wished to pursue its  own cases. 
Law  enforcement  officials  determined  that  much 
of the wrongdoing - tax  fraud  and  kidnapping -
appeared to have occurred in  Russia.  The  Bank of 
New York was  not accused  of any wrongdoing. 
A  politically  connected  Moscow  bank  was  at  the 
heart of a scheme that siphoned about USD  7 bil-
lion from Russia  through the Bank of New York Co. 
Court  documents  supporting  the  government's 
successful  seizure  of  a  US  account  owned  by 
Sobinbank, which transferred  money out of Russia 
from  1995 to  1999, portrayed it as  a central  play-
er  in  the  operation.  Specifically,  federal  investiga-
tors seized  USD  15  million in  1999 from a Sabin-
bank account in the Bank of New York and the FBI 
believed that Sobinbank-controlled accounts at the 
American  bank  were  responsible  for  moving  'the 
vast  majority'  of USD  7  billion  channelled  out of 
Russia  from  1996 to  1999. 
The  documents allege  Sobinbank's  account was  a 
significant factor  in  the flow of funds from  Russia 
to three Bank of New York accounts maintained by 
Russian  emigre  Peter  Berlin,  who  along  with  his 
wife  former  Bank  of  New  York  official  Lucy  Ed-
wards,  pleaded guilty in federal  court to conspiracy 
to launder money.  They  also  cooperated  with the 
government's probe. 
The documents also  link Sobinbank to accounts of 
Benex and  Bees  International  LLC,  also  maintained 
by Mr Berlin. 
The  complex  money-transfer  system  was  estab-
lished  chiefly  to  send  funds  from  Russian  im-
porters to their western suppliers without detection 
by Russian  tax authorities. 
The  documents  also  reveal  further  evidence  that 
the system  for moving funds through  the Bank of 
New York  was  used  to transfer  money to  individ-
uals connected with organised crime in  Russia. 
As well as a previously reported USD 300 000 kid-
napping ransom that was paid through the system, 
US  authorities  found  traces  of funds  in  the  com-
plex web of transactions that were linked to Russ-
27 ian  organised  crime.  For  instance,  in  1997,  two 
members  of  a  Russian  organised  crime  group 
charged  with  extortion  and  kidnapping  received 
more than  USD  1 million  in  transfers  from  an  ac-
count  in  the  name  of  Benex  International  Co., 
which was  maintained by  Mr Berlin. 
Furthermore,  it  appears  that  USD  85  000  was 
transferred in  1999 from the Benex account to two 
Russian  organised  crime  figures  of interest to  the 
Federal  Bureau  of Investigation. 
Sobinbank,  founded  in  Moscow in  1990, became 
one of the  most politically connected  financial  in-
stitutions  in  the  country.  It  was  put together by  a 
collection of larger powerful banks,  some of which 
had  ties to President Boris  Yeltsin's  inner circle,  in-
cluding Boris  A.  Berezovsky,  Russia's  leading finan-
cier and  media tycoon. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
In  all  aspects  of large-scale  criminal  monies  ema-
nating from  Russia,  and  the  necessary  illicit trans-
fer  a central  factor is  the banking sector.  This  sec-
to; is  also  pivotal  in  the furtherance  of the reform 
programme  within  Russia.  Therefore,  should 
progress  and  improvements  within  the  Russian 
banking  system  be  impeded,  and  the  trend  of 
criminal  involvement  and  control  remain 
unchecked,  it will  result  in  long-term  adverse  ef-
fects  regarding  OC  and  money  laundering  within 
the EU. 5. Trafficking in drugs 
5.1. Drugs in general 
Although  a huge  amount of drug-related  informa-
tion  and  intelligence is  available,  there is  only lim-
ited  information  on  the  role  of  east  European 
countries  and  central  Asia  as  transit  regions  for 
drug trafficking  into the  EU  (53). This  may be  due 
to  the  fact  that  considerable  amounts  of  drugs 
transiting the region  are  smuggled  into Turkey first 
and then continue their way via  the Balkan  routes. 
Fierce repression by the Iranian authorities (54)  has 
forced drug traffickers to look for alternative routes, 
particularly  through  central  Asia.  These  trends  of 
drug trafficking from central Asia via  Russia towards 
Ukraine, central and eastern  Europe  (CEE)  and the 
Baltic States  pose an  increasing threat to the Euro-
pean  Union. Special  concern  (55)  is  caused  by the 
situation  on  the  southern  border between  Russia 
and  central  Asia,  in  particular  with  Kazakhstan.  In 
1998-99, 80 Dfo  of heroin, 84 Ofo  of hashish, 60 Dfo 
of opium and  53  Dfo  of marijuana  seized  in  Russia 
came from this direction. 
The  emergence  of  drug  exports  from  the  CIS 
countries  to  western  Europe  has  been  brought 
about primarily by the fact that the domestic drug 
market  has  been  oversupplied  and  prices  have 
dropped  drastically.  In  this  respect,  Russian  drug 
experts  say  that the  Russian  market  seems  to be 
saturated  and  the  State  Customs  Committee  of 
Russia  has stated that the EE-OC drug gangs strain 
to expand their activities towards western  Europe. 
( 53)  In this respect, several contributions have their origin in of-
ficial reports as well as open sources. Use was also made of 
several reports of the UNODCCP and the EMCDDA. 
( 54)  In  1999,  Iranian  law agencies  seized  204 485 kilograms 
of opium, 22  764 kilograms of morphine and  6 030 kilo-
grams of heroin  (UNODCCP). 
( 55)  Russian  drug situation report  7  999. 
The  latest information states that over  1 500 drug 
trafficking  gangs  are  working  in  and  outside  Rus-
sia  (56).  Moreover,  there  are  indications  showing 
Russian  OC  groups as  active  buyers  and  providers 
on  drug markets  through  the  use  of their existing 
criminal networks within and outside the EU  (57). 
For  these  reasons,  the  Russian  Government  has 
set up an  interdepartmental working group to draw 
up  the  draft  of  a  federal  special-purpose  pro-
gramme  to  intensify  the  fight  against  OC  in  the 
years 2001-03 (58). 
5.2. Heroin 
5.2.1. Source countries 
According to the United Nations Office for Drug Con-
trol and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP), global illicit 
opium production in  1999 reached a record level of 
almost  6  000 tonnes.  About 80  Ofo  of all  heroin 
seized  in  the  EU  originates  from  south-west Asia. 
Afghanistan  is the world's leading opium-producing 
country, with 4 600 tonnes harvested in  1999. 
The  UNODCCP  assumes  that  the  annual  opium 
production in  Afghanistan  in  2000 will decrease to 
3  275 tonnes,  due to severe  drought and  efforts 
by  the Taliban  rulers.  However,  a report issued  by 
the International  Narcotics  Control  Board  says  that 
the  commitment  by  Afghanistan's  purist  Islamic 
(56)  Segodnya gazeta,  Moscow,  28 September  1999. 
( 57)  IRT,  Dutch  Research  and Consultancy Department, EE-OC 
-A threat to  the Netherlands?,  Nijverdal,  1999. 
( 58)  Russian  Government  web  site  (www.gov.ru),  7  January 
2000. The priority of this programme lies in counteracting 
OC,  particularly  in  the  areas  of  illegal  drug  trafficking, 
financial  crime and  corruption. 
29 Afghanistan and its dubious honour: 
the world's leading opium-producing country 
Main cultivation areas of opium (95 °/o  Taliban-controlled) 
Taliban  movement to ban  poppy growing and  opi-
ate  processing is questionable. Furthermore, a UN-
ODCCP  survey  stated  that  95  °/o  of Afghanistan's 
1999  poppy  cultivation  was  in  Taliban-controlled 
areas. 
Large  amounts  of heroin  are  also  believed  to  be 
stored  in  northern  Afghanistan  for  further  trans-
portation. 
The  rapid  spread  of  illicit  crop  cultivation  in  the 
central Asian  countries is another cause  of concern 
to the international bodies. 
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Turkey continues to  be a gateway for the trafficking 
of heroin along the various  Balkan  routes into the 
EU.  In  1999,  Turkish  law  enforcement  agencies 
seized  3  602 kilograms  of heroin.  The  2000 (59) 
(as of September) statistics reported by Turkish  au-
thorities  indicate  a substantially  unchanged  situa-
tion: 3 995 kilograms  of heroin  seized. 
Although  heroin  seizures  in  1999  in  central  Eu-
rope,  particularly  in  Romania,  Hungary  and  the 
Czech  Republic  decreased  compared  with  1998, 
there are  still  strong indications that  large amounts 
of  heroin  are  stored  in  depots  in  that  region  for 
secondary  distribution.  Based  on  what  has  been 
recently reported  by the authorities of almost all  of 
these  countries,  the  traffic  of  heroin  along  the 
Balkan  routes  remains very important. This  may be 
confirmed  by the steady growth of heroin  seizures 
in  Bulgaria.  Albania  is  increasingly being  used  as  a 
transit country for the trafficking  of heroin,  notably 
to  Italy and  Greece. 
Lorries,  private  cars  and  buses  are  predominantly 
used  to transport heroin  along the  Balkan  routes. 
Organised criminal groups have built up a sophis-
ticated distribution network. Turkish  criminal groups 
still  dominate the  heroin  traffic  from  Turkey  along 
the various  Balkan  routes.  'Subcontractors'  of such 
groups  recruit  couriers  from  among  petty  young 
criminals in central and some west European coun-
tries. These couriers are not members of the crimi-
nal group and are not informed about its structure. 
It  is  even  believed  that  EE-OC  groups  engaged  in 
trafficking human beings (THB) via the Balkans link 
their criminal  activities with trafficking drugs. 
In  the  last  decade,  new  drug  smuggling  routes 
have emerged from the 'Golden Crescent' to west-
ern  Europe. These  routes cross  central  Asian  coun-
tries,  Russia,  Caucasian  countries  and  eastern 
Europe. 
Afghanistan's  opium  and  processed  heroin,  which 
will  end  up on the consumer markets of the  Euro-
pean  Union, are  increasingly being moved through 
the central Asian  republics of Turkmenistan,  Uzbek-
istan, Tajikistan,  Kyrgyzstan  and  Kazakhstan. 
( 59)  Presentations  during  the  workshop  'Transport  of  drugs 
along the silk route',  Wiesbaden, Germany, 20 to 22 Sep-
tember 2000. 
The transit role  of central  Asia  is  largely due to  its 
geographical  location  between  Afghanistan  and 
Iran, on the one hand, and  Russia,  other members 
of the  CIS  countries  and  Turkey,  on  the  other,  all 
with  emerging  consumer  markets  or  access  to 
western  Europe  (6°). 
This  role  is  facilitated  by the  unstable  political  and 
economic situation  as  hundreds  of jobless  people 
are  ready  to  work  as  drug  couriers  for  only  a pit-
tance.  Furthermore,  as  a consequence  of  under-
paid  border  service  staff's  vulnerability  to  corrup-
tion,  law  enforcement  officials  are  among  those 
protecting drug dealers. 
The closure of the Afghan-Uzbek border at Termez 
has  led to  large quantities of drugs entering Uzbek-
istan through Tajikistan.  Estimates by the UNODCCP 
indicate  that  the  equivalent  of  20-30 tonnes  of 
heroin  may  cross  the  territory  of  Tajikistan  on  its 
way  to  western  markets.  The  Afghan-Tajik  border 
is  also  guarded  by  Russian  border troops  (
61
). 
Kazakhstan,  being the only central  Asian  State that 
borders Russia, is a major transit country. Kazakh au-
thorities have strong indications that criminal organ-
isations want to use the country for transiting drugs 
into  Russia  and  onwards into the  EU.  On the other 
hand,  Kazakhstan  is close to producing high-quality 
heroin  on  its  territory  (62).  In  1998-99, 80 o;o  of 
heroin  seized  in  Russia  came  from  this  direction. 
Furthermore, there are  no  safe  zones  left along al-
most the entire 70 000 km Russian border (63). The 
(60)  According  to  the  Russian  drug  situation  report  7  999, 
more than  a half of heroin  (by quantity) seized  in  Russia 
was  destined for further transit shipment to western  Eu-
rope. 
( 61 )  In  particular,  General  Totsky,  Director of the  Russian  Fed-
eral  Border Guards  Service, took the liberty of openly crit-
icising  his  Tajik  colleagues.  According  to  him,  in  January 
1999, in  accordance with an  agreement with the republi-
can  authorities, the Federal  Border  Service  started  an  ex-
periment of handing over protection of a 20 km stretch of 
the Tajik-Afghan  border to Tajik frontier guards.  However, 
two months after the beginning of the experiment, it was 
learned  that  the  flow  of drugs  and  firearms  had  grown 
many  times  in  the  'training  zone'  - the  local  frontier 
guards had  simply opened the border to drug couriers. 
( 62)  According  to  a  statement  of  the  United  Nations  Drug 
Control  Programme Coordinator, Alma  Yesirkegenova. 
( 63)  According  to  General  Konstantin  Totsky,  Director  of the 
Russian  Federal  Border Service,  during a press conference 
on the eve  of Frontier Guards'  Day,  June  1999. 
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the new stretches of the border (64). 
Routes  from  Afghanistan  into  central  Asia  link  up 
with the  Balkan  routes via  the Caspian  Sea  or Rus-
sia,  the  Caucasian  countries  and  Turkey. 
One  of the  main  drug trafficking  routes  runs  from 
Afghanistan into Turkmenistan and onwards, via the 
Caspian  Sea  port  of Turkmenbashi  to  the  port  of 
Baku (65)  in Azerbaijan and via Armenia into Turkey. 
Another major trafficking route from Afghanistan is the 
M41, the route from Afghanistan via  Khorog in Tajik-
istan  to  Osh  in  Kyrgyzstan  and  onwards,  via  Uzbek-
istan and Kazakhstan to Russia or into the Caucasus. 
Lorries,  containers  and  buses  are the  usual  means 
of transport  used  in  the frequently occurring over-
land  shipments. 
The  central  Asian  republics  have  a relatively  mod-
ern  railway  network,  which  dates  from  the  former 
Soviet  era  and  which  connects  them  with  Russia. 
Thus,  criminal  groups  use  this  means  of transport 
for  trafficking  heroin,  particularly  to  Russia. 
Tashkent  (Uzbekistan),  Termez  (Uzbekistan),  Al-
maty  (Kazakhstan)  and  Dushanbe  (Tajikistan)  are 
all  directly  or  indirectly  connected  with  Moscow. 
Couriers  travelling  in  passenger  trains  as  well  as 
goods trains  are  used for drug transport. 
Criminal  groups  involved  in  trafficking  heroin  also 
make  use  of  international  airports  in  the  central 
Asian  republics.  Direct  routes  connect  several  of 
these airports with Tehran, Karachi, Islamabad, Istan-
bul, Moscow, London, Birmingham and Frankfurt. 
Drug  traffickers  also  seem  to  have  rediscovered 
the ancient 'silk route'  as  a gateway for the trans-
port of their illicit goods.  Heroin  is  smuggled  along 
these  routes  through  Russia  into  east  European 
countries for further distribution  into the  EU. 
Opiates  originating  from  the  'Golden  Crescent' 
bound for Europe also transit Caucasian and Black 
( 64)  Since  there  is  no  money  to  build  special  trespassing 
warning systems, the  Russian  Federal  Border Service  has 
to depend  solely on  servicemen  and  build frontier posts 
based  on  three soldiers for each  kilometre of border. 
( 65)  Seizures  of heroin at the seaports of Astrakhan, Turkmen-
bashi  and  Baku  indicate  the  importance  of the  Caspian 
Sea  for drug smuggling. 
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Sea  regions. Although the role of Chechnya as dis-
tribution centre for heroin originating in Afghanistan 
has decreased in recent years (66), according to FSB 
(Russian  Federal  Border  Service)  documents,  the 
Chechen rebel leader,  Basayev, still maintains close 
contacts with Afghanistan  (67), on the one hand, as 
well  as  with  the  Baltic  States,  on  the  other  hand. 
Heroin is particularly smuggled into the Baltic States 
via  the  lngoshetian  airport of Slepzovsk,  Ufa,  Saint 
Petersburg  and  Kazan.  Mountain  paths  connecting 
Chechnya with  Georgia  and Azerbaijan  offer ample 
opportunities for heroin smuggling. 
Ukraine  is well  placed  as a strategic location for all 
types  of smuggling.  The  Black  Sea  makes  it a nat-
ural  link  between  Asia  and  Europe.  The  Crimean 
ports have a long history of trafficking and  most es-
timates predict that this trend will increase over the 
coming years  (68). Due to  the  lack of border con-
trols,  the  Odessa  area  is  particularly  notorious  for 
drug trafficking. 
An  extension  of  the  transit  of  heroin  smuggling 
through  Estonia  (69)  is  expected  towards  Nordic 
countries  and  other areas  of western  Europe,  due 
to the continuous growth of white heroin trafficking 
in  Estonia  and  the  coinciding  growing  demand  in 
Finland. 
There  is  also  intelligence  on  the  intensification  of 
heroin  smuggling  by  rail  from  the  Golden  Triangle 
countries  through  the  territory  of  China  and  the 
Russian  far east into Europe  (7°). 
Criminal  groups  from  Turkey,  Afghanistan,  Iran 
and  Pakistan  have  gradually  extended  their  influ-
ence  in the heroin production region,  partly replac-
ing indigenous groups. 
( 66)  German  Society  of  Foreign  Politics,  EU-Russian  Forum, 
Room  document  handed  over  by  Alexander  Zdanovich, 
FSB  Russia,  Berlin,  21  and  22 January 2000. 
( 67)  In  particular,  General  Dustum  and  Premier  Minister Gul-
beddin  Hekmatiar. 
( 68)  The  influence of OC groups  in  the Black Sea  area,  partic-
ularly the  Crimean  peninsula,  has  led  one  leading com-
mentator  to  dub  the  region  'Ukraine's  Sicily'.  Research 
suggests  that  the  pre-eminent  groups  in  the  Black  Sea 
area  are the Seilem, the Sheviov and  the Bashmaki. 
( 69)  Presentations  during  the  workshop  'Transport  of  drugs 
along  the  silk  route',  Wiesbaden,  Germany,  20  and  22 
September 2000. 
(7°)  Russian  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Drug  situation  in  the 
Russian  Federation,  Moscow,  November 1999. OC groups are reported to be active in  the Osh  re-
gion,  located  at the border with  Uzbekistan  (7
1
). 
In  the Odessa  region,  based  around  the port,  OC 
is well established with an  estimated 6 000 partic-
ipants.  These  criminal  groups  have  strong  links 
with the  Brighton  Beach  area  of New York,  which 
has  for  some  time  been  a focus  of  US  law  en-
forcement efforts against EE-OC.  In  addition, many 
Ukrainian  criminals  served  in  the  former  German 
Democratic  Republic  (GDR)  and  have  good  con-
tacts  in  German criminal  groups. 
Opiates  and  the  essential  chemicals  used  for the 
processing  of  heroin  cross  each  other  along  the 
above-described  routes.  In  other  words,  large 
amounts  of precursors  are  being  smuggled  from 
the manufacturing countries in  the opposite direc-
tion through the European  Union, central and east-
ern  Europe, Turkey,  Russia and the central Asian  re-
publics  into  Afghanistan.  This  is  illustrated  by  the 
amount of acetic anhydride seized in several  coun-
tries along the Balkan  routes and  in  central  Asia. 
Only this  year,  the  Romanian  authorities  seized  19 
tonnes of this chemical and the quantities seized  by 
the  Bulgarian  law  enforcement  agencies  increased 
from 2.9 tonnes in  1999 to some 8.2 tonnes in the 
first eight months of 2000. Furthermore, on this route, 
the amount of acetic anhydride seized in Turkey up to 
September  2000 was  6.2  tonnes  (72),  compared 
with nearly 38 tonnes seized the year before. 
In  1997,  11  tonnes  of precursors  were  seized  in 
Kazakhstan.  In  1998, Uzbek customs seized  a total 
of 98 tonnes of acetic anhydride. This  includes  16 
tonnes  that  were  seized  in  Termez  at  the 
Uzbek-Afghan  border  in  containers  that  arrived 
from China  via  Kyrgyzstan. 
In  Turkmenistan,  41  tonnes  of  acetic  anhydride 
were seized  in  1998. The  additional  availability of 
precursors  in  the  area  is  offered  by  the  chemical 
industry in  Kazakhstan, which produces substances 
whose use  can  be subsequently diverted  into that 
of precursors. 
(7 1)  Transhipment bases  and  drug caches  have been  installed 
in the cities of Kunduz,  lmamsahib, Talukan  and  Faizabad, 
and  the  villages  of  Bahorak,  Hash,  Jarm,  lshkashim,  Kalai 
Panj, Sarshah,  Kalai  Barpanj, Sarchashma, Sudush, Pojdvar 
and  Chovid  of the  Badakhshan  province. 
(72)  Presentations  during  the  workshop  'Transport  of  drugs 
along the silk route', Wiesbaden,  Germany,  20 to 22  Sep-
tember 2000. 
5.2.3. The impact on the EU 
In  several  Member States,  particularly in  Belgium, 
Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  the  United  King-
dom,  Turkish  criminal  groups  still  control  the  im-
portation  and  wholesale  distribution  of  heroin. 
They maintain close  links with indigenous and  oth-
er ethnic groups (such as  ethnic Albanian-Yugoslav 
groups),  which  handle different parts  of the chain 
from Turkey,  along the Balkan  routes  into Member 
States.  These  criminal  networks  are  entrepreneur-
ial,  business-like  and  highly flexible  in  responding 
to  changing  market  situations,  using  non-criminal 
business specialists and  structures to facilitate their 
criminal  activities  (73). 
Other Member States  observe a growing influence 
of ethnic  Albanian-Yugoslav  OC  groups  in  heroin 
trafficking, even replacing Turkish  criminal groups in 
that field.  Like the Turkish  groups,  ethnic Albanian-
Yugoslav  criminal  organisations  cooperate  with  in-
digenous  groups  in  the  Member  States  and  in 
countries along the routes  into the EU. 
The  consequences  of heroin  trafficking  are  enor-
mous and  serious.  It  is  estimated that 3  to 5  mil-
lion European Union citizens have tried heroin. The 
consequent  supply  to  consumer  markets  is  mas-
sive and it is thought that over 1  00 tonnes of hero-
in  are  being  shipped  into  the  Member  States 
annually. 
5.3. Cocaine 
5.3.1. Source countries 
Cocaine  originates  in  Latin  America,  particularly  in 
Colombia,  Peru  and  Bolivia. 
5.3.2. Transit 
Although about 90 Ofo  of all  cocaine trafficking is  in 
the  hands  of Colombian  criminal  groups,  EE-OC 
groups are  becoming more and  more active in  co-
caine  smuggling.  Unsurprisingly,  the transit  role  of 
central  and  eastern  Europe  developed  further  in 
1998 and  1999. 
(73)  Document  6611/00  Crimorg  36,  The  prevention  and 
control of OC - A European strategy for the beginning of 
the new millennium,  Brussels,  3 March  2000. 
33 Due  to  its  location,  Ukraine  is  becoming a signifi-
cant corridor for the transit of narcotic drugs,  espe-
cially those originating in  Latin  America.  Its  numer-
ous ports on the Black Sea  and  its  porous borders, 
coupled  with  poorly  funded  and  underequipped 
customs  and  border  services,  make  Ukraine  in-
creasingly  attractive  for trafficking  organisations.  In 
late  1998, foreign companies began to divert ships 
from  the  Black  Sea  ports  of  Novorossiysk  and 
Tuapse  due  to  the  alleged  involvement of organ-
ised  crime groups at these  locations.  Ukraine's im-
portance to  drug traffickers  as  a transit corridor to 
the  EU  and  eastern  Europe  is  increasing  as  evi-
denced by the following seizures:  in  port areas  on 
the Black Sea,  625 kilograms of cocaine originating 
in  Colombia  and  250 kilograms  of cocaine  paste 
originating  in  Ecuador  were  seized  in  1998.  Fur-
thermore,  a  shipment  of  4  tonnes  of  cocaine 
headed  for  Europe  was  discovered  by  US  Coast 
Guard  officers  who  boarded  the cargo  vessel  Chi-
na Breeze  in  the Caribbean.  Sources  said  that the 
entire  vessel's  crew  was  of  Ukrainian  nationality 
and  that  her  owners  were  based  in  Odessa, 
Ukraine. 
It  is  also  worth  noting that Ukraine's  neighbouring 
country,  Moldova,  has  reported  on  intermittent 
seizures of cocaine moving from central Asia to Eu-
rope and  precursor chemicals moving in the oppo-
site direction. 
Cocaine  is  brought  to  Russia  both  directly  from 
Latin  America  and  indirectly through  transit States, 
in  particular the central Asian  States.  It is transport-
ed  by couriers  on  planes coming from that region, 
in  containers  by  sea  and  mailed  through  postal 
services.  The  arrest of Andrew Cline,  a coordinator 
of the  Afghan  and  South  American  drug  dealers 
who  are  active  in  the  Russian,  European  and 
American  markets, was one of the most successful 
operations  of  the  National  Security  Service  of 
Uzbekistan  (UNSS)  (74). 
In  addition,  there  are  some  other  serious  indica-
tions  that  EE-OC  and  its  associates  have  estab-
lished drug trafficking partnerships with Colombia's 
top drug barons  (75). 
C 4 )  Andrew Cline  organised  a single  shipment of  13  tonnes 
of drugs from Asia  to Europe via  Russia.  His  headquarters 
was  situated  in  Bolivia  where he was  out of the reach  of 
any special  service. 
C 5)  According to documents filed  in  a federal  court in  1998, 
an  undercover US  drug enforcement agent was  involved 
in  brokering a deal  (which in the end was  not concluded) 
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According to  Russian  expert data,  the Baltic  States 
have  begun  playing a noticeable  role  in  the inter-
national  cocaine  smuggling  network.  After  arriving 
at ports in  the east European  Baltic States,  cocaine 
continues further towards the European Union and 
Russia  (76). 
Well-conspired  West  African,  particularly  Nigerian, 
organised  groups  with  international  links  are  be-
coming more and  more active  in  the Russian  drug 
trade.  According  to  statistics  drawn  up  by  the 
Moscow Anti-Drug Unit (GOUVD), Nigerian nation-
als  were  by far the biggest group of foreigners  ar-
rested  in  Moscow  and  the  surrounding  area  for 
drug offences. Russian  police reports say that Nige-
rians  are  protected  by  the  largest  EE-OC  groups: 
the  Russian  Solntstevskaya  and  the  Orehevo 
gangs.  These  groups  allow  Nigerians  to  sell  drugs 
on  their territory against  payment of /taxes'. 
5.3.3. The impact on the EU 
There  is very limited information concerning EE-OC 
involvement in  cocaine trafficking into the Member 
States. 
Colombian  groups still  control  the worldwide sup-
ply of cocaine. Within the EU,  the Netherlands and 
Spain  are  primary  gateways  for  the  importation 
and  further  distribution  of  cocaine.  However,  co-
caine  trafficking  via  east  European  countries  to 
western  Europe seems to increase year by year. 
The  consequences  on  EU  society are  demonstrat-
ed  by  the estimation  that  1-5 Ofo  of young adults 
in  the European  Union have tried cocaine.  In  addi-
tion, Colombian police sources estimate that some 
180  tonnes  of this  drug will  enter  the  European 
Union  in  2000. 
between  Russian  OC  groups  and  Colombian  drug  lords 
for the delivery of a USD  35  million  Soviet navy subma-
rine.  This  submarine  would  have  been  able  to  carry  40 
tonnes of cocaine  per trip. 
Three  years  before  there  was  a  (successfully)  brokered 
sale  of six  Soviet Ml-8  military helicopters to the Colom-
bian  cocaine  cartels  at  USD  1 million each. 
C 6)  Russian  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Drug  situation  in  the 
Russian  Federation,  Moscow,  November  1999. 5.4. Synthetic drugs 
5.4.1. Source countries 
As  was the case  in  previous years,  most ampheta-
mine-type  stimulants,  such  as  ecstasy,  seized  in 
the  Member  States  in  1999  originated  primarily 
from the Netherlands and  Belgium.  Other sources 
are  the  Baltic  States.  Pre-accession  States,  particu-
larly  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary  and 
Poland,  are  increasingly  becoming  producers  of 
synthetic drugs. 
5.4.2. Transit 
There  seems to be an  increasing demand for syn-
thetic  drugs  in  many  central  and  east  European 
countries.  However,  the  most  significant  destina-
tion  countries  for  amphetamines  and  ecstasy  in 
1999 were Germany,  France  and  the United  King-
dom. 
Russia  has  reported  C
7
)  that  synthetic  drugs  are 
brought to  it from  Germany,  the  Netherlands and 
Poland through western and  north-western regions 
of  its  territory.  On  the  borders  with  the  Baltic 
States,  the situation  is  characterised  by  a trend  of 
increased  drug  smuggling.  In  this  way,  the  Baltic 
States  are  becoming a main distribution centre for 
all  kinds  of  drugs.  While,  in  previous  years,  the 
drugs  smuggled  in  this  region  were  mostly poppy 
straw and  cannabis, cases of amphetamine as well 
as  heroin  and  cocaine  smuggling were  noticed  in 
1998  and  1999.  There  is  also  information  that 
suggests  that  some  EE-OC  groups  in  the  Baltic 
States  use  legitimised  chemical  and  pharmaceuti-
cal  industries for the production of synthetic drugs. 
Another  transit  area  for  drugs,  especially  for  syn-
thetic  ones,  seems  to  be  the  Kaliningrad  re-
gion  C 8).  Due  to  its  geographical  location  as  a 
Russian  enclave  in  Poland,  this  region  could  gain 
increasing  importance  after  Poland's  accession  to 
the  EU. 
Although intelligence in Sweden suggests that Pol-
ish  groups control the trafficking of amphetamines 
(77)  Russian  Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Drug  situation  in  the 
Russian  Federation,  Moscow,  November 1999. 
(78)  According  to  an  interview  on  5  November  1998  with 
Aleksandr Orlov, at that time representative of the Russian 
president. 
from Poland  via  Germany and  Denmark to Scandi-
navia,  there are indications that drug smuggling via 
the Baltic  States  is  increasing. According to Finnish 
customs, the amount of narcotics seized from trav-
ellers  from  Estonia  indicates  that this  country  has 
been  used  to pass  illegal  drugs into Finland  more 
than  in  any previous year C 9). 
In  fact,  Estonian authorities (80)  have reported that 
their country has  gained  international-scale  impor-
tance  as  an  area  of significant transit (towards the 
Nordic  countries)  and  origin  of  certain  narcotic 
drugs.  Specifically,  synthetic  drugs  are  moving  in 
both  directions  from  western  and  central  Europe 
(mainly via  Belgium, the Netherlands and  Poland), 
but drugs are also produced in  local laboratories. In 
both  cases,  Estonian  experience  shows  that  am-
phetamines and  metamphetamines of double ori-
gin are delivered to Nordic countries as having been 
produced in  western  Europe. The  extensive conse-
quences  suffered  by  the  street  trade  of  drugs  in 
Helsinki  when  Estonian  police  apprehend  a  key 
criminal figure in their country is a clear indication of 
how Estonia's  role  in  the  trade  of amphetamines 
has a direct impact in  Finland. Another increasingly 
important source of profits for local traffickers is the 
smuggling of precursors from  Russia  through  Esto-
nia  to  western  Europe.  A  portion  of those  sub-
stances belongs to Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania. In 
addition, participation of Estonian criminals in smug-
gling  precursors  coming from  China,  Thailand  and 
Vietnam has also been noticed. 
5.4.3. The impact on the EU 
Amphetamine  and  amphetamine-type  stimulants 
are,  next to cannabis,  the second  most abused  il-
licit drugs in  the European  Union. According to the 
EMCDDA,  1-4  o;o  of  all  adults  in  the  European 
Union  have  experienced  amphetamines.  Ecstasy 
has  been tried  by  1-5 o;o  of young adults. The  us-
age  rates  for both  drugs  are  significantly  higher  in 
the  United  Kingdom,  where the  area  of synthetic 
drugs  is  the  most  rapidly  expanding  drug  market 
with  an  estimated  ecstasy  consumption  reaching 
1 million tablets a week. 
(79)  Between  November  and  December  1999,  Finland's 
southern  customs  authority  uncovered  seven  serious 
drug-related crimes;  six were related to Estonia. 
(80)  Estonian  presentation  during the  workshop  'Transport  of 
drugs  along the silk route',  Wiesbaden,  Germany,  20 and 
22 September 2000. 
35 5.5. Cannabis 
5.5. 1  . Source countries 
Morocco  remains  the  main  country  of origin  for 
cannabis  resin.  According to Europol's information, 
about 85 o;o  of all  cannabis resin  seized within the 
Member States  originates  from  this  country  using 
Spain  as  the gateway to the European  Union. 
According  to  the  Russian  drug  situation  report 
7  999, wild growth of cannabis occurs  in  the south 
of Siberia  and in the far eastern  regions,  as well as 
in the northern Caucasian  region  on  over  1 million 
hectares and  on  100 000 hectares in  Ukraine (81 ). 
In  addition,  central  Asia  is  increasingly becoming a 
major  cannabis-growing  region.  Cannabis  grows 
wild  in  Kazakhstan.  According  to the  UNDCP,  the 
largest  area  of  hemp  growth  in  the  world,  at 
340 000 hectares, is the Chu valley of Kazakhstan. 
Other production areas are Taldukorgan,  Kyrgyzstan 
(60  000  hectares),  Uzbekistan  (Samarkand  re-
gion)  and  Tajikistan.  Pakistan  and  Afghanistan  are 
also  significant sources of cannabis  resin. 
5.5.2. Transit 
Cargo  ships  or containers  are  predominantly used 
for  the  trafficking  of  cannabis  resin  from 
Afghanistan/Pakistan,  as  well  as  herbal  cannabis 
from  main  sources  such  as  Colombia,  Jamaica, 
Nigeria  and  South  Africa.  In  addition,  the  route 
from  Afghanistan  through  central  Asia  into  Russia 
and  along  the  silk  route  into  Ukraine  and  central 
and  eastern  Europe towards the EU  is  also  an  im-
portant trafficking  route for Afghan  cannabis  resin. 
Large  amounts  of  Afghan  cannabis  have  been 
seized  in  recent  years  by  authorities  in  Turk-
menistan and  Kazakhstan. 
Central  and  eastern  Europe  is  therefore an  impor-
tant  transit  region  for  cannabis  destined  for  the 
Member States.  Of particular note is  the influence 
of  Ukrainian  OC  in  cannabis  smuggling.  In  June 
1999, over 6 tonnes of cannabis  resin  were burnt 
in  the furnaces  of the  Uzhorod  brick  plant by  the 
(
81
)  Measures taken to destroy hotbeds of cannabis sprouting 
have  not  brought  positive  results.  As  Russian  specialists 
state,  depending on  climate zones,  1 hectare of cannabis 
can  reproduce  up  to  10  million  seeds,  which  preserves 
reproduction capability for five years. 
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Ukrainian  secret  services.  The  consignment  of 
6  141  kilograms  of hashish  was  confiscated  from 
two  nationals  of  the  Czech  Republic  at  the 
Uzhorod  checkpoint on  the  Ukrainian-Siovak bor-
der in January  1998. The  hashish was  declared  as 
parquet  and  was  to  be  shipped  from  Uganda  to 
the Czech  Republic for the  non-existent company 
'Bohemia  Furniture  Parquet'.  Another  6  tonnes  of 
herbal  cannabis  from  Nigeria  were  seized  in  the 
port of Odessa. 
As  already  mentioned,  there  is  only  limited  infor-
mation on the influence of EE-OC in the EU.  In the 
United  Kingdom,  British  Caucasian  groups control 
the importation and  wholesale of cannabis.  EE-OC 
groups  often  infiltrate  pre-accession  States,  recruit 
young  drug  couriers  and  help  other  criminal 
groups to smuggle cannabis into western  Europe. 
5.5.3. The impact on the EU 
As  in  other  regions  of the  world,  cannabis  is  the 
most prevalent illicit drug of abuse in the EU.  Sub-
sequently, seizures in  the Member States are  mas-
sive. 
According to the EMCDDA, over 40 million people in 
the European  Union have used  cannabis. On  aver-
age, about one in every four 15- to 34-year-olds has 
tried cannabis. Indications are, however, that there is 
a convergence in  usage levels where higher preva-
lence countries show a stabilisation  or decrease in 
use and  lower prevalence countries indicate an  in-
crease. In addition, statistics show that seizure levels 
remain  high  in  Spain,  France,  Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom and that the Nordic Mem-
ber States are experiencing a marked increase, albeit 
from significantly lower base  levels.  Belgium,  how-
ever, with historically high seizure levels, has seen a 
decrease over the last two years. 
5.6. General conclusions 
The Balkan  routes are  likely to remain the principal 
trafficking  routes  into  the  EU  of heroin  and,  to  a 
lesser extent, cannabis  resin  from  south-west Asia. 
The  threat to the  EU  of drug trafficking via  central 
Asia  is  increasing as  large  amounts  of drugs  tran-
siting  central  Asia  are  smuggled  into  Turkey  first 
and then continue via  the Balkan  routes. In  addition, drugs transit Russia  along the silk route 
towards Ukraine as well as  central and eastern  Eu-
rope for subsequent trafficking into the EU. 
Member States have to be aware that the transit role 
of central Asia is seriously influenced by the unstable 
political and economic situation in the region. 
Large  amounts  of  cannabis  and  opium  poppy 
grow  wild  in  the  central  Asian  republics  and  the 
rapid  spread  of illicit crop  cultivation  is  a cause  of 
concern. The region has the potential to supersede 
traditional  supply  regions  in  Africa,  Latin  America 
and  south-west Asia. 
Criminal  groups  from  Afghanistan,  Iran,  Pakistan 
and  Turkey  are  increasingly  involved  in  drug  traf-
ficking  in  central  Asia.  Organised  crime  is  also 
strongly present in  other key transit regions. 
Law  enforcement  in  the  regions  involved  is  hin-
dered  by  a lack  of legislation,  resources,  expertise 
and  equipment and by rivalry between the law en-
forcement agencies. The  level  of corruption makes 
the  exchange  of  sensitive  information  extremely 
difficult  between  Member  States  and  the  con-
cerned  east European  counterparts. 
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6.1. Trafficking in human beings 
in general 
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Basically,  this  chapter  gives  a 
description  of  the  situation 
concerning  the  phenomenon 
of trafficking  in  human  beings 
(TH B)  (82)  as  precisely as  pos-
sible.  It  is  not the  intention  to 
present  a  detailed  threat  assessment  regarding 
long-term future trends.  However,  on  the basis  of 
the Member States'  contributions and  other infor-
mation, it is  possible to see trends that provide in-
dications on  possible future developments. 
THB  into the Member States will  probably continue 
to increase or at least remain at current levels.  Eco-
nomic discrepancies and conflicts in various parts of 
the world will also function as 'push and pull' factors 
in the future for a large amount of people seeking a 
better future within the Member States. These factors 
will ensure a large supply of potential victims to be re-
cruited by the sex industries in the Member States. 
Furthermore,  huge  potential  profits  will  probably 
stimulate more involvement of OC  groups in  TH B. 
This,  in turn, could lead to increased trafficking and 
more  sophisticated  modi  operandi  used  by  the 
criminals,  as  well  as  increased  competition among 
criminal  groups.  The  last  could  occasionally  result 
in  the escalation  of violence between  some crimi-
nal  structures. 
( 82)  The  definition  can  be found  in  the annex to the Europol 
Convention: 'Traffic  in  human beings means subjection of 
a person  to the real  and  illegal  sway of other persons  by 
using violence or menaces or by abuse of authority or in-
tngue with a view to the exploitation of prostitution, forms 
of sexual  exploitation  and  assault  of minors  or  trade  in 
abandoned children: As from  1 January  1999, the defini-
tion  was  supplemented  with  the  following  text:  'These 
forms  of exploitation  also  include the production,  sale  or 
distribution of child-pornography material: 
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According  to  experts  and  some  of  the  national 
contributions, the TH B crime situation  is  underesti-
mated and not properly understood. Subsequently, 
many  law  enforcement  agencies  in  the  Member 
States do not allocate appropriate resources to the 
fight against THB.  If a greater priority is  not given to 
combat THB,  the situation  may  inevitably worsen. 
When  potential  profits  are  very  high  and  the  risks 
of imprisonment  rather  low - as  in  the  case  of 
TH B - there  is  an  immense  risk  of attracting  or-
ganised  crime involvement in  the criminal  area. 
6.2. Victims and their countries 
of origin 
UN  figures  have  shown that as  many as  4  million 
people  are  smuggled  into  foreign  countries  each 
year generating up to USD  7 billion  in  illicit profits 
for criminal syndicates. The  general trend  in  recent 
years,  which  has  also  been  pointed  out in  several 
national contributions to this report,  is  the increase 
of victims from  CEE  illegally moved to the EU. 
According to Anita  Botti,  Deputy Director of the Of-
fice for International Women's Issues in the US  De-
partment of State,  Russia  and  Ukraine  are  among 
the main 'source' countries from which women are 
exported  and  exploited. 
The Member States that are the closest to CEE  ap-
pear  to  be  more  affected  by  trafficking  from  this 
part  of Europe,  but Spain  and  France  also  report 
that an  increase in victims from  CEE  has  been ob-
served.  However, many victims are still trafficked to 
Europe from Africa,  Asia  and  Latin  America. 
Economic discrepancies are the main factors behind 
trafficking in human beings. This is a well-known fact 
and is stated in various studies undertaken by non-
governmental  organisations  (NGOs),  as  well  as some of the national  contributions. The  victims al-
ways originate from countries that are economically 
disadvantaged  in  comparison  with  the  Member 
States. Poverty and/or the hope of a more prosper-
ous future are important reasons behind the ability 
to recruit or lure victims into sexual exploitation (83). 
No overall figures are available of the total  number 
of victims trafficked to the EU  each  year,  but there 
are  reasons  to  believe that they should  be  count-
ed  in  hundreds of thousands  (84). Due to the na-
ture of the main factors behind THB,  several  Mem-
ber States are of the opinion that THB will increase 
further  or at  least  stay  at  the  current  level  in  the 
foreseeable future. 
Furthermore,  the  profits  from  trafficking  are  very 
high  and  in  several  of the national  contributions it 
is  reported  that  EE-OC  groups  are  increasingly  in-
volved  in  THB. 
Trafficking  from  CEE  has  increased  continuously 
during  the  1990s.  This  is  reported  by  almost  all 
Member States,  and  often  stated  by  various  gov-
ernmental and  non-governmental organisations.  In 
the Greek  contribution,  it is  said  that 90 Ofo  of all 
foreign  victims  of trafficking  in  1998  came  from 
CEE.  The  closeness  of Greece  to  the  central  and 
east European source countries is the main reason 
for the large share of victims from this region.  Ger-
many reports that approximately 75  Ofo  of the vic-
tims  in  1998 came  from  eight of the central  and 
east  European  countries,  most  from  Poland, 
Ukraine and the Czech  Republic (85). 
Probably the  countries  that  neighbour central  and 
east  European  States  have the largest influx of vic-
( 83)  Russian  and  Ukrainian  women,  looking for  a way  out of 
poor  economic  conditions  resulting  from  the  significant 
spillover  effect  in  Ukraine,  have  only  exacerbated  the 
problem  of human  trafficking  which  began  with  the col-
lapse  of the Soviet Union  in  1991. 
( 84)  The  Geneva-based  International  Organisation  for  Migra-
tion  (10M)  states  that,  since  Ukrainian  independence  in 
1991,  organised  criminal  gangs  have  illegally  trafficked 
about 500 000 Ukrainian  women to  the west.  Of those, 
the  10M  estimates that  at  least  one  in  five  is  trapped  in 
the  sex  industry,  largely  in  the  EU  Member States  (and 
this  is  the  most conservative  estimate).  Furthermore,  re-
search  studies  by  Dr Gerben  Bruinsma  of Leiden  Univer-
sity indicate that 33  %  of approximately 25 000 women 
working  in  the  Netherlands  came  from  Ukraine  and  an 
additional 3 %  came from  Russia. 
( 85)  The  total  number  of  victims  registered  in  Germany  in 
1998 was  840. 
tims from this  region,  but,  as  already stated,  Spain 
and  France  report a significant increase  of women 
trafficked  from  CEE.  Moreover,  in  an  official  Por-
tuguese report to  Europol  concerning illegal  immi-
gration,  cases  are  mentioned  in  which  women 
have  been  trafficked  from  Moldova  (86)  and 
Ukraine to Portugal.  Other major 'source' countries 
are  Albania,  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Lithua-
nia,  Poland,  Romania  and  Slovakia. 
Almost  all  the victims  tend  to  be  female  and  the 
age  range  is  in  general  between  18 and  30 years. 
This  is  depriving the Russian  and  Ukrainian  labour 
force  of  valuable  human  capital,  because  the 
women  who  are  trafficked,  unlike  many  of their 
Asian  counterparts,  are  often  women  with  high-
school  or  university-level  education.  Unconfirmed 
intelligence  and  other  information  indicate  that 
much younger female victims have also  been traf-
ficked;  some as young as  13  or  14 years  (87). Fur-
thermore,  there  is  information,  confirmed  by 
known  Member  States'  cases  of  previous  years, 
that  boys  and  young  men  have  been  trafficked 
from CEE to some of the Member States.  It  is  pos-
sible that this type of trafficking still  takes  place. 
An  unfortunate consequence  is  that trafficked  vic-
tims are  often illegal  immigrants and  have  little in-
centive  to  report  their  exploitation  to  the  police. 
This  reluctance  makes  them  vulnerable  to threats 
and  health  risk.  Moreover,  in  addition to the risk of 
expulsion  as  illegal  immigrants, the victims  are  of-
ten  afraid  of giving  evidence  due  to  threats  and 
other pressure from the exploiters. 
6.3. Modi operandi 
6.3.1. The criminals 
The size,  nature and  origins of the groups involved 
in  trafficking  vary  both  within  and  between  the 
Member  States.  Sometimes,  there  are  small 
groups of people consisting of just three to five in-
dividuals that take  care  of the whole  chain  of ac-
tivities  related  to the trafficking.  However,  although 
( 86)  In  December  1998, Moldovan  border guards  discovered 
four  underground  tunnels  through  which  illegal  immi-
grants  were  channelled  to  Romania.  The  tunnels  were 
over 200 metres  long and  well  constructed.  Over 2 000 
people were detained in  1998. Several  EE-OC gangs  had 
an  interest in this  business. 
( 87)  This  was  stated  explicitly in  the UK national  report. 
39 a  generalisation  is  not possible,  it  seems  that,  in 
many  Member  States,  the  groups  and  networks 
most often  involved  are  larger,  between 5 and  20 
people,  and  satisfy  most of the  EU  criteria  for or-
ganised  crime.  The  groups  often  have  some  hier-
archical  structure,  divisions  of  responsibilities  (re-
cruiters,  escorts,  procurers  and  brothel-keepers, 
etc.), are profit driven and their activities often con-
tinue  over  a considerable  period  of time.  Several 
countries  report an  increased  involvement in  traf-
ficking  by what  is  referred  to  as  'organised  crime 
groups' or 'Mafia-type' organisations. The  organisa-
tions  involved  in  trafficking  have,  as  said  in  the 
Spanish  contribution amongst others, an  infrastruc-
ture and  access to useful contacts in  the countries 
of origin  and  destination. 
In  1998, the  British  Chilworth  Group  reported  the 
existence  of  increasing  evidence  of  cooperation, 
on  an  ad  hoc  basis,  between  OC  groups  in  indi-
vidual  Member States  (mostly Italian)  and  EE-OC 
groups  in  dual  criminal  ventures,  particularly  relat-
ing to prostitution (88). 
The  criminals  are  predominantly  nationally homo-
geneous  and  come  to  a  large  extent  from  the 
same  country  or geographical  region  as  their vic-
tims. This  is  valid  for the exploiters  in  the destina-
tion countries as well  as the recruiters and  escorts. 
EE-OC  groups are  dominant in  the trafficking from 
central  and  east European  countries. 
A general  trend  reported  by  most of the  Member 
States  is  the  increased  involvement  of  criminals 
from  CEE  in  the  sex  industries  of the  destination 
countries. This  increase  is  parallel to the increased 
influx of victims from  CEE  into the  EU,  and  in  line 
with the general findings described. In  many Mem-
ber  States,  successful  operations  have  been  con-
cluded where EE-OC groups have been involved in 
this activity. The problem of trafficking women from 
the FSU, particularly Ukraine, is having a clear impact 
on the vice trade in  the rest of Europe. Clearly, the 
ongoing conflicts in the Balkans are both exacerbat-
ing the situation and  providing a route into the EU 
for unwilling women. Certain  operational  data  and 
anecdotal  evidence  suggest  that this  issue  has  at 
least two follow-on problems: an increase in the vol-
ume of crime (such  as  burglary, theft and  prostitu-
( 88)  In a related case, three Russian  managers of a travel com-
pany  in  Hanover,  Germany,  who  had  obtained  German 
nationality, sent more than 3 000 officially attested invita-
tions  to  Kazakhstan,  Russia  and  Ukraine,  in  order to get 
women  for  the  west  European  sex  industry.  They  have 
been  sentenced for trafficking in  human beings. 
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tion) and the creation of safe areas for the more sin-
ister elements from EE-OC groups. 
The modi operandi used by the criminals that are en-
gaged  in THB show similarities when taking into ac-
count the country/region from which the victims are 
trafficked.  However, differences exist depending on, 
for example, visa restrictions and travel opportunities. 
In  the  specific  case  of the  Albanian  criminals  in 
France,  since  autumn  1999,  they  have  been  set-
tling/residing  in  neighbouring  countries,  mainly 
Belgium, Germany and Spain  and  limit their travels 
to France. They are using prostitutes who they trust 
as  money  couriers  to  collect  and  transport  the 
money from  France to, for instance,  Belgium. 
6.3.2. Recruitment 
Many  women  who  previously  were  active  prosti-
tutes in their home country are among the victims of 
THB.  It is  stated in  several  of the national contribu-
tions that many victims knew at the time of recruit-
ment that they would work in the sex industry, but 
later, when it appeared that the situation was much 
worse than  promised, they were unable to escape 
from  their  situation.  However,  victims  have  often 
been recruited with deceit and false  promises. The 
women are  promised jobs as  club  hostesses,  bar-
tenders, waitresses, dancers, etc., but upon arrival in 
the country of destination they are forced into pros-
titution. When a woman accepts a proposal to work 
abroad,  the  recruiters  often  provide  assistance  for 
necessary documents and travel. The women have 
to pay back the cost of these services at a later stage. 
Less frequently, the women are 'recruited' and trans-
ported by the use  of threat and  violence, although 
this  is  normally used  in  the later stages  of the ex-
ploitation. Some of the known ways through which 
victims are recruited are listed below: 
friends and  acquaintances; 
newspapers and  recruitment offices (89); 
( 89)  In  some  countries,  advertisements  in  newspapers,  or 
sometimes at recruitment offices, are used to find women 
willing to migrate and take on a job in western Europe. The 
job offers vary, although it is often implied and understand-
able for the women that the job in reality is within the sex 
industry.  In  the French  contribution, it is said that those in 
charge of recruitment are often businessmen or company 
managers  (this  has  been  observed  in  cases  concerning 
Thai  and  Benin  networks). Their legitimate activities often 
enable them to obtain visas,  travel  documents, etc. These 
people 'sell' the women to criminal groups. bars,  discos and  nightclubs; 
from  the  local  sex scene; 
marriage of convenience  (90); 
threats  and  violence. 
6.3.3. Routes and means 
of transportation 
From  CEE,  a  variety  of  routes  and  means  are 
utilised  to  transport the  victims  into  the  EU  coun-
tries.  The victims are trafficked  by air,  car,  and train 
and  sometimes  by  ferry.  Most  of  the  trafficking  is 
probably overland. 
The  typical  route  for  east  European  women,  who 
ultimately become prostitutes  in  the  EU,  is  simple. 
The  women  are  transported  from  their  homes  to 
consolidation  points  near  the  border  with  the  EU 
or  PAS  (
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). They  are  then  moved  (often  via  the 
Balkans),  with  many  actually  remaining  in  the  re-
gion,  particularly  in  Bosnia.  In  most  cases,  repre-
sentatives  of  EE-OC  groups  take  over  the  control 
of the  women  who  are  then  forced  into  prostitu-
tion  or  other  aspects  of the  vice  trade.  It  is  com-
mon  pratice for criminal  groups to  pay  a series  of 
bribes whilst moving women. 
Since  1997,  ethnic  Albanian-Yugoslav  OC  groups 
have formed a ready-made chain of contacts which 
can  be exploited for trafficking human  beings. One 
accompanying indicator worthy of note concerns an 
urban  area  in  the  north  of the  Netherlands.  There 
are  signs  of a violent conflict between  Turkish  and 
ethnic Albanian-Yugoslav  criminal  groups  regarding 
establishing a monopoly in prostitution. 
In  regard to Italy,  in  1997 it was estimated that be-
tween 20 000 and 25 000 prostitutes of foreign ori-
gin  were  residing  in  that  country,  originating  from 
Nigeria, Albania and central Europe (92). The ethnic 
Albanian-Yugoslav proportion  has increased sharply 
(9°)  In  a few reports,  mention  is  made of arranged  marriages 
between women and  individuals in  the destination coun-
tries only for the purpose of obtaining the necessary resi-
dence permits. 
(91)  In  particular,  Ukrainian  women  are  transported  in  west 
Ukraine  near Uzhorod. 
(92)  Migrations-Sociales,  published  by  the  Centre  d'informa-
tions  et d'etudes sur  les  migrations  internationales  (ClE-
M!),  Paris,  1997. 
Distribution throughout 
and beyond Europe 
Source:  Europol  OC  Department 
over  a five-year  period.  According  to  the  Albanian 
Ministry  of  the  Interior,  Italian  law  enforcement 
recorded  100 prostitutes of Albanian origin in Italy in 
1991. In  1996, the number had risen to 4 800 (93). 
This  continues  to  increase  partially  due  to  the 
change in  method by Albanian  organisers and  pro-
curers. Since early 1996, in order to procure women 
and  adolescents often by force,  they have concen-
trated on the rural areas of Albania, mainly the Fieri, 
Berat  and  Bulqize  districts  where  they  are  less 
known than in urban areas (94). In some cases, vic-
tims are transported  by ferry from  Albania  or other 
Balkan countries over the Adriatic Sea to the eastern 
Italian  coast.  Thereafter, they enter illegally and  are 
transported further into the country. 
Within  Germany,  ethnic  Albanian-Yugoslav  groups 
have  been  involved  in  organised  prostitution  for 
some time.  Since late  1997, they have increasingly 
engaged in this activity with a degree of notable vio-
lence. Such  groups tend to replace Turkish criminal 
groups  in  dominating  certain  red-light  areas.  As  a 
part of this criminal activity, ethnic Albanian-Yugoslav 
OC groups have engaged in trafficking of minors for 
prostitution purposes. During  1997, up to  150 ado-
lescents  in the  Berat region  were  reported to have 
been abducted for trafficking to Italy and Greece. 
In  the  Greek contribution,  it  is  stated  that  most of 
the women  enter via  roads  in  the  northern  part of 
Greece.  Women  with  valid  travel  documents  are 
transported  through  normal  entry  points,  whilst 
( 93)  Cited  in  Koha Jane,  14  December  1997. 
(94)  International  Organisation  for  Migration,  Trafficking  in 
women  to  Italy for sexual exploitation. 
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cles,  such  as  TIR  (Transport  international  routier) 
trucks,  or walk across  the border. 
6.3.4. Use of forged documents 
Forged  documents are  used  when  necessary,  and 
probably  extensively  (95). The  criminal  groups  of-
ten arrange the supply of the required travel  docu-
ments, for example by using contacts that can  pro-
vide  forged  papers  (96)  or  through  the  bribery  of 
officials.  Victims  could  also  use  legally  obtained 
documents,  but the  stated  purpose  of the  travel 
may be false.  That  is,  the victims are  provided with 
genuine student or tourist visas,  residence permits, 
or official  permission  for  jobs  in  the  legal  labour 
market.  There  are  cases  known  when  criminal  or-
ganisations  have  established  rather  sophisticated 
business  structures  with  front companies  such  as 
travel  agencies  and  nightclubs,  both  in  the  coun-
tries  of origin  and  destination,  in  order  to  obtain 
the necessary documents for travel  and  residence. 
Upon arrival  in  the country of destination, it is  very 
common that the  criminals  confiscate  the victims' 
identity papers  and  other travel  documents,  occa-
sionally  exchanging  them  for  new  false  docu-
ments. 
In the French  report,  it is  said  that the cases  of for-
gery  identified  include  false  passports  (with  or 
without change of identity) with false visas,  or false 
visas  being inserted into genuine passports. It is al-
so  said  that,  in  the country of destination, the gen-
uine passport may be  confiscated  and  a forged  or 
falsified  passport,  or a false  residence  permit,  pre-
sented to the victim. 
6.4. Types  of criminality linked 
to THB 
In  most  of  the  EU  Member  States,  THB  is  not 
coded  as  a crime  in  itself.  The  crimes  related  to 
trafficking  vary,  depending  on  the  way  different 
(95)  This  is  mentioned in  several  national contributions. 
(96)  In  late  1998, false  Slovenian  passports  were  used  by  a 
growing  number of ethnic Albanian-Yugoslavs  arriving  in 
Belgium  by  air.  During  the  same  penod,  UK  authorities 
noted a continuing trend  in  the use of fraudulent Sloven-
ian  documentation  including  stolen  passport  visas  and 
driving licence applications. 
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criminal  groups  operate.  In  this  way,  common 
crimes  are  document forgery,  abuse  of immigra-
tion laws,  unlawful coercion,  unlawful threat,  extor-
tion,  bodily  harm,  aggravated  assault,  sexual  as-
sault,  rape,  procuring, tax evasion and  money laun-
dering. 
Several  criminal groups engaged  in trafficking have 
also  diversified  their  activities  and  commit crimes 
that are not related to trafficking, although a certain 
group  may  use  the  same  logistic  and  support 
structures for many types of criminality.  It  is  stated 
that the  following  forms  of criminality  have  been 
found linked to criminal groups engaged  in traffick-
ing  in  human  beings:  drug  trafficking  (Belgium, 
France,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK  (97)); illegal 
firearms trafficking (Belgium and  the Netherlands), 
car  theft  (the  Netherlands),  illegal  immigration 
(Belgium) and  fraud  (the Netherlands). 
6.5. The  situation in the country 
of destination 
Once in  the country of destination, the victims are 
forced  to  comply  with  the  demands  of  the  ex-
ploiters,  either  immediately  or  after  being  forced 
into  prostitution  or other forms of sexual  exploita-
tion. The victim may, for example, first start working 
as  a bar hostess,  but later be  forced  into  prostitu-
tion.  The  exploiters  could  be  brothel-owners  who 
have  ordered  women  from  traffickers,  or  it  could 
be the criminal  group behind the recruitment and 
transportation  which  also  controls  the  actual 
sexual  exploitation of the victim. 
It would  appear from  a study of the  national  con-
tributions that the victims  of trafficking are  less  of-
ten visible in  street prostitution or 'windows' in  red-
light areas, where they can  be seen  and  helped by 
police  or  social  workers,  and  are  more difficult to 
control  by the  criminals.  Instead,  they are  offered 
to  customers  in  bars,  clubs,  sauna  clubs  and  hid-
den brothels and  apartments of very low standard. 
Having been  utilised for a period at one place, the 
victims,  in  many cases,  are  moved to new cities or 
areas  where they can  be  further exploited.  Some-
times,  they  are  sold  again  to  other  criminals  or 
brothel-owners. 
(97)  Mentioned  in  the  contributions  of the  Member States  in 
brackets. Reality for the victims  in  the country of destination 
is  not always what was  expected. Often their pass-
ports are  taken  away and  the earnings  are  consid-
erably less than  was  promised. They  have to work 
very  long  hours  and  the  overall  work  and  living 
conditions are very bad. 
Meanwhile the health  of the women trafficked  ap-
pears  to deteriorate  in  line with the general  trend 
in  this area  within the States  involved. 
Several  areas  within  Russia  have  seen  a dramatic 
increase,  particularly  in  the  past two years,  in  the 
rate  of diseases  relating to both AIDS  and  various 
stages  of  HIV.  In  1998,  the  total  of  HIV-positive 
cases  officially  stood  at  5  073,  of  which  50  o;o 
were diagnosed for the first time in  1998. The  in-
crease  of drug abuse  appears  to be  a major con-
tributory factor  to  this  trend,  together with  overall 
sexual  behaviour patterns. 
Other diseases are also taking their toll. In  Moscow, 
of the 26 000 prostitutes  detained  in  police  cus-
tody in  mid-1997, over 30 °/o  were syphilitic.  Russ-
ian  statistics  show  a  general  increase  in  syphilis 
cases  of 1 500 °/o  in  adults and  2 000 Ofo  in  chil-
dren  between  1990 and  1998. 
6.6. Profits gained by THB 
As  is  stated  in  the Dutch contribution, the earnings 
from  trafficking  in  human  beings  are  enormous. 
According  to  the  contributions,  it  seems  that the 
average  daily sum  that could  be earned  per victim 
is around  EUR 350. Thus,  a criminal group control-
ling  1  0  women,  which  is  not  uncommon,  could 
potentially receive  an  income of EUR 3 500 a day. 
In  one  of several  cases  referred  to  in  the  French 
national  contribution,  a  highly  structured  criminal 
network  controlled  some  50 young  women.  The 
women  charged  their  customers  between  FRF 
1 500 and  FRF 8  500 for their services.  The  prof-
its  made on the women were ploughed into major 
real-estate investments in  the south-east of France. 
In  the UK  contribution,  it is  stated  that the overall 
estimated criminal benefit figures for operations in-
volving  trafficked  victims  during  1998 amount to 
GBP 9 948 000 (EUR  14  600 000). 
In  the  German  report,  it  is  calculated  that  the 
total  profit  for  trafficking  in  connection  with  63 
different  investigations  was  OEM  15 006 245 
(EUR  7 500 000) (98). 
Thus,  THB  is  a  very  lucrative  criminal  business. 
This,  in  addition to the difficulties in getting the vic-
tims  to  testify  and  the  sometimes  brief  imprison-
ment convictions,  is  probably the main explanation 
for the  increased  involvement of what can  be  la-
belled  as  organised  crime. 
Finally, it is very important to mention that bank ac-
counts are  opened under the names of prostitutes 
and  victims  in  the  country  of  origin,  which  ham-
pers  law enforcement investigations. 
6. 7.  Use of violence 
Some Member States have reported an  increase in 
violence by the Albanian 'pimps' towards the pros-
titutes and  their families  in  their home countries. 
6.8  ..  Conclusions 
Based  on what is  stated  in  this chapter, the follow-
ing main conclusions  may be drawn. 
Most of the  EU  Member States  are  affected 
by THB. 
THB  is  a transnational  and  complex phenom-
enon, which  has to be met with  increased  in-
ternational  cooperation  and  a  multi-agency 
approach. 
The  main  trend  has  been  the  rise  in  victims 
originating from  CEE.  However,  many victims 
are  still  trafficked  from  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin 
America. 
There  are  case-related  indications  that  OC  is 
increasingly involved  in  TH B. 
Case  information shows that the profits made 
in  this type of criminality can  be very large. 
THB  is a very cruel  crime where victims are al-
ways  subjected  to  severe  psychological  pres-
sure and  often physical  violence. 
(98)  Those 63 investigations were 20 % of the total  number of 
investigations related to trafficking in human beings in  1998. 
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in general 
The  main  aim  of  this  chapter  is  to  define  the 
Member  States'  crime  situation  in  the field  of ille-
gal  immigration  (99). 
Briefly,  illegal  immigration  involves  the  facilitation 
of a border crossing and  the smuggling of people. 
Although  THB  may  also  involve  an  illegal  border 
crossing,  it  encompasses  by  definition  a form  of 
exploitation  of  the  persons  themselves,  for  In-
stance for sexual-oriented  business  purposes. 
Although  exact figures  are  hard to  obtain,  it is  esti-
mated  that,  amongst  the  375  million  inhabitants 
living in the  EU  at the end of 1998 (1°0), over 3 Ofo 
(around  13  million)  were  legally  resident  immi-
grants  (not including  EU  citizens  residing  in  anoth-
er  EU  country).  In  accordance with  the  United  Na-
tions  figures  on  population  trends,  2  Ofo  of  the 
worldwide population  are  migrants  (1°
1
). 
The number of people residing illegally in the  EU  is 
harder  to  determine,  but  may  range  between  3 
and  6 million. 
This  criminal  industry  is  strongly  based  on  a cash 
economy, like most of the other OC trafficking adivi-
(99)  Contributions  were  received  from  14  Member  States 
which provided valuable data to produce this chapter.  Ad~ 
ditional  sources  have  also  been  used  for  this  report, 
namely studies edited and  published by international gov-
ernmental  and  non-governmental  organisations  such  as 
Cirefi,  UNHCR,  IGC  and  ICMPD  in  order to  complement 
and  more  comprehensively  integrate  the  data  available 
from the Member States'  contributions. 
( 100)  Population  Reference  Bureau,  'World  population  data 
sheet',  1999 (www.prb.org). 
(1°
1
)  UNFPA,  Report  on  the  state  of the  world  population 
1999.  The  world population  statistically  reached  6 billion 
during this year. 
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ties. If the money travels with the illegal immigration 
flow,  then  it  is  also  smuggled  across frontiers,  from 
less developed financial systems to the more sophis-
ticated, computerised financial systems in the EU. 
7.2. Illegal immigrants and their 
countries of origin 
Although  the  main  origin  countries  of  asylum-
seekers  were  Afghanistan,  Croatia,  the  Federal  Re-
public of Yugoslavia, Iraq and Rwanda, migration from 
the CIS countries and the Baltic region has developed 
further. The economic decline and instability following 
the  overall  political  situation  were  increasingly  the 
main reasons for illegal immigration. A large percent-
age of this flow was directed towards Russia, but most 
migrants continue to move to Germany (55 Dfo), Israel 
(19 °/o) or the United States (12 Ofo)  (1°2). 
In  this  sense,  it  is  important  to  mention  that 
amongst the main dominant illegal immigrants' na-
tionalities registered  by the Member States are the 
Moroccans  and  Algerians from  Africa,  and  the Chi-
nese,  lraqi/Kurds  and  Sri  Lankans  from  the  Asian 
continent.  The  other  nationalities  associated  with 
the  illegal  immigration flow to the  EU  are  reported 
by  the  Member  States  as  ethnic  Albanian-Yu-
goslavs,  Romanians  and  Poles. 
7.3. The  illegal immigration 
situation 
Over the  past  decade,  the  'political  geography'  of 
the  European  continent  has  dramatically  changed: 
(1°2)  10M  News  Release,  'Migration  in  the  CIS',  No  826,  Inter-
national  Organisation  for  Migration,  6  July  1999 
(www.iom.int). not  less  than  27  'new'  countries  have  emerged 
which  now represent  CEE.  In  this  respect,  criminal 
groups  around  Europe,  which  used  to  smuggle 
drugs and  other commodities,  have  been transfer-
ring their network facilities  to the  newly emerging 
'business' of illegal  immigration as  well  as  THB. 
The  market is  highly profitable and  the risks  asso-
ciated,  notably the  law  penalties,  are  negligible  in 
comparison with other forms of trafficking. 
7.3.1. The criminals 
It has to be stressed that organised illegal immigration 
involves not only groups in  the country of origin.  In-
ternational  criminal  structures  are  firmly established 
along the borders of EU neighbouring countries. 
The fact that the majority of people smuggled into 
the  EU  have  been  assisted  by  small  criminal 
groups, which often have  ad  hoc based  structures, 
does  not preclude  'professional'  approaches  from 
the criminal  organisations  involved  with  illegal  im-
migration. Moreover, the longer the distance for il-
legal  immigrants, the  more important it is  to  have 
a good  network on  which  to  rely.  The  continuous 
impact of these criminal organisations' activities on 
the  EU  borders  is  anticipated  due  to  the  circum-
stance that the  EU  adjacent countries do not have 
the necessary 'filter effect' to control ongoing illegal 
immigration towards the west from  east  European 
countries.  In  several  reported  cases,  the organisers 
were  not of the same  nationality as  the smuggled 
people. Nationals and  immigrants from central and 
east  European  countries  (for  instance,  from  the 
Czech  Republic,  Romania,  Slovenia,  Poland, 
Ukraine or Moldova)  involved  in  transnational  net-
works  are  often  relevant  on  a global  scale.  This  is 
apparently based  on  close  ethnic ties. 
7.3.2. Routes and means of illegal 
immigration 
During the first  half of  1998,  over  11  000 illegal 
immigrants  were  apprehended  at  Ukraine's  bor-
ders.  Over  half  of  these  came  from  south-east 
Asia,  Asia  and  the Middle East. 
Ukraine  is  increasingly used  as  a transit country to 
the west - once illegal  entry is  gained  to Ukraine, 
the  next  leg  of the  journey  westwards  is  across 
Poland,  Slovakia,  Moldova and  Hungary. 
The following table 
shows the nationality 
of the investigated 
and/or detained smugglers. 
Smugglers: Top  10 nationalities 
1  Former Yugoslavia 
2  T~rkey 
3  Germany 
4  Czech ·Repuplic 
s  .China 
6  Ukraine:· 
.  . 
1 ·  ;Romania  · 
8  Afrk:a (varibU$ :countries) 
9 · .  Pa~istan 
1  0  Slovenia· 
The  Portuguese and  Spanish  contributions confirm 
this fact.  There  have  been  a large  number of inci-
dents  of  illegal  immigrants  coming  from  Ukraine 
and  Moldova. Their modus operandi would appear 
to be the following. The procedure begins with ob-
taining a standard  visa  for a short stay through  lo-
cal travel agencies. This visa  is backed  up with pur-
ported tourist journeys to Italy or the Netherlands. 
The  visas  are  issued  in  several  consular offices  or 
embassies  from  Germany,  Spain,  France,  the 
Netherlands and  Austria  located  in  the  capitals  of 
central  and  east  European  countries:  Chisinau, 
Kiev,  Bucharest,  Budapest,  Prague  or  Moscow. 
Once  a  big  group  is  gathered,  the  journey  is 
arranged  using  medium-sized  or  large  passenger 
vehicles  and  crosses  several  borders  including the 
Austrian. When  arriving in  Portugal or Spain, another 
member of the organisation will contact the group, 
frequently  at  bus  or  coach  stations,  to  provide 
them  with  lodgings  or  clandestine  jobs.  Some-
times,  the immigrants are  abused  and  left without 
the valid  documents, money or tickets  required  to 
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al  job  offers.  The  usual  price  for  the  journey  is 
about USD  1 000. 
Some  further  examples  illustrate  the  impact  of 
EE-OC  on  the  EU. 
In  December  1998, Moldovan  border guards 
discovered  four underground tunnels through 
which  illegal  Asian  immigrants  were  chan-
nelled  to  Romania.  The  tunnels  were  over 
200 metres  long  and  well  constructed.  Over 
2 000 people were detained in  1998. Sever-
al  EE-OC  groups  had  an  interest  in  this  busi-
ness. 
In  October  1998,  an  aeroplane  conta1n1ng 
100  illegal  refugees  from  Afghanistan  was 
stopped  by  the  Czech  authorities  at  Prague 
airport.  The  aircraft  had  travelled  from 
Moldova.  The  Czech  authorities  were  con-
cerned  that the  Moldovans  had  let the plane 
through  knowing  that  it  contained  illegal  im-
migrants.  It  was  also  believed  that the  immi-
grants  were  possibly  CIS  citizens  claiming  to 
be  Afghans  for  political  purposes.  They  are 
said  to  have  paid  between  USD  2  500 and 
USD  5 000 per person for their transport. The 
Czech  Government said  it would consider the 
reimposition  of visas  to  persons  arriving from 
Moldova. 
In  October  1998,  police  in  Israel  detained 
150  stowaways  on  a  ship  docked  in  Haifa. 
The  ship  had  travelled  from  Odessa.  The  ille-
gal  immigrants were  Moldovan nationals. 
Countries outside the EU  which  are  used  as  a last 
'transit  point'  before  the  illegal  immigrants  are 
moved  into  the  EU  are,  in  particular,  Russia, 
Ukraine,  Hungary,  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic, 
Macedonia,  Romania,  Slovakia  and  Turkey.  In  this 
way,  central  and  east European  countries accumu-
late the double status  as  places  of origin for some 
illegal  immigration  flows  and  'stopover'  places 
used  by  networks  exploiting  the  Asian  routes, 
combined with the use  of specific Middle East air-
ports  for  long-distance  trips.  In  addition,  Italy  re-
ported that the  lgoumenitsa  to  Corfu  (Greece)  to 
Venice  (Italy)  route  was  another route  utilised  by 
EE-OC groups. 
It seems  clear that Denmark and  the Netherlands 
are  the  main  transit  points  and  the  first  countries 
where an  asylum  application  is  presented  in  order 
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to  reach  Sweden,  Finland  or  Norway.  Sweden 
noted that ferries from non-European  Union coun-
tries in the Baltic area  have also been used.  In  oth-
er cases, the immigrants have  crossed  the borders 
between central/east European  countries and  Ger-
many before they reach  their destiny in  the north. 
Finland  identified a route for Tamil  groups from  Sri 
Lanka  through  Moscow by  plane and  later by  bus 
to the Finnish  border. 
In the EU,  the most preferred destination countries 
are  Germany,  France,  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
Netherlands  and  Italy.  Geographically  speaking, 
these  countries  represent  not  only  a  substantial 
part of the  EU  territory but also  a large  proportion 
of its  external  frontier,  both on  land  and  sea. 
7.3.3. Use of forged documents 
The  documents used  by  illegal  immigrants can  re-
sult  mainly  from  forgery  (genuine  document  al-
tered  to  comply  with  the  details  of  the  current 
user),  from  counterfeiting  (document  wholly  or 
partially manufactured to resemble the original)  or 
obtained  fraudulently  (genuine  document  ob-
tained  by deception). A genuine document is  also 
used  or,  more properly,  misused  by  an  immigrant 
when  he  acts  as  an  impostor attempting to  pass 
off as  the person  named on  the document. In  this 
connection,  Germany  reported  that  some  smug-
gling  organisations  seem  to  be  responsible  for 
break-ins  into  German  office  buildings  in  order to 
procure the required  documentation. 
An  example  of the  use  of  stolen  genuine  docu-
ments  is  also  provided  by  the  results  of an  Irish 
police  authority  investigation,  which  revealed  a 
passport  swindle  that  may  have  helped  bring 
dozens  of  false  refugees  into  the  country.  The 
stolen passports were being continually sent to Ro-
mania,  where they were  altered  and  used  repeat-
edly  for  passage  into  Ireland.  Three  stolen  Irish 
passports,  three  Romanian  documents  and  other 
international  driving  licences  and  ID  papers  were 
discovered  during  a  raid  on  an  apartment  in 
Dublin.  Six  Romanians,  four  of whom  were  from 
the  same  family,  were  discovered  in  the flat.  The 
investigators  believed  that  the  gang  was  offering 
'package  deals'  to  fellow  countrymen.  A  Russian 
gang,  linked  to  the  Mafia,  was  also  involved  in  a 
fake  passport operation  (1°3). 
(1 03)  The  Mirror,  London,  20 September 2000. 7.4. Types  of criminality linked 
to illegal immigration 
The  main forms of OC linked to illegal immigration 
cases that were reported are  the following: 
drug  trafficking  (mainly  ethnic  Albanian-
Yugoslavs  and  Nigerians); 
trafficking in  arms  (Albanian  rings); 
money  laundering  (Russian,  Albanian  and 
Asian  rings)  through  travel  companies,  travel 
agencies,  import-export companies,  credit in-
stitutions,  the  transport  industry,  hotels,  bars 
or restaurants; 
trafficking  in  human  beings  (central  and  east 
European  countries,  African  countries,  South 
American  rings,  Albanian  networks  and  lately 
Chinese  rings  exclusively  for  the  Chinese 
community); 
trafficking in  stolen vehicles. 
Press  conference by members of Russian  security forces  alleg-
ing high-level  corruption 
Other crime areas  reported  are: 
corruption; 
forgery I  counterfeiting; 
kidnapping,  extortion; 
bogus marriages; 
tax fraud; 
professional  break-in thefts; 
clandestine labour; 
child  pornography (reported  by  Italy concern-
ing Chinese  rings  in  connection with THB); 
petty  crime  (France  found  illegal  Romanians 
involved  in  this area  of criminality). 
7.5.  Profits gained through 
illegal immigration 
According to the International Centre for Migration 
Policy Development (ICMPD), the number of illegal 
immigrants entering the  EU  during  1998 was  esti-
mated at about 500 000. The  possible global  rev-
enues from alien smuggling probably reached  USD 
10 billion (about EUR 9 billion) during this period. 
Some  alleged  prices  paid,  as  stated  by  the  illegal 
immigrants, are the following: 
from  Pakistan  to Germany:  EUR  6 000; 
from  Kosovo to Germany:  EUR  400; 
from  Kosovo  to  France:  from  EUR  770  to 
EUR  3 076; 
from  east  European  countries  to  Italy:  from 
EUR  512 to EUR  862; 
from  east  European  countries  to  Portugal: 
EUR  862. 
Trafficking in human beings has become the world's 
most lucrative illicit industry, with profits rivalling the 
drug trade and with far more lenient penalties. The 
number of migrants on the move around the world 
has doubled in the last 30 years, and now comprises 
an  estimated  120 million.  Global  trafficking in  un-
documented migrants is estimated to generate USD 
5 billion to USD 7 billion a year. 
7.6. Conclusions 
Although  the  migration  flow  into  the  European 
Union  is  in  essence  a socioeconomic problem  re-
quiring  a comprehensive  answer  from  the  EU  in-
stitutions  at  political  level,  it  has  become  increas-
ingly apparent that illegal  immigration  is  also  a se-
rious  criminal  problem  impacting  on  all  Member 
States. 
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pletely determine the level of threat of the organised 
criminal  structures  working  in  illegal  immigration. 
The  indicators  available  from  every  Member State 
clearly  show  involvement of criminal  elements  in 
the migration flows to the EU  and that this provokes 
a variety of interlinked criminal activities. 
The estimated profit is  a primary motive for the in-
volvement of criminal organisations in  illegal  immi-
gration.  Consequently,  the  co-related  financial  as-
pects  of  illegal  immigration  networks  (revenues, 
amount  of  payments,  phases  and  type  of  pay-
ments,  layering  of  the  money  received,  money 
management, etc.) must be reported and analysed 
in  depth, allowing a comprehensive understanding 
of the overall  criminal  activity. 
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Research  in  the past has  revealed  that criminal  or-
ganisations  do  not restrict themselves to only one 
area  of crime  if  other  opportunities  occur.  Illegal 
immigration can  be  seen  as  just another challeng-
ing  opportunity.  The  number  of  potential  immi-
grants  cannot  really  be  estimated,  but it could  be 
millions. Criminal organisations will gain further po-
tential  as  long  as  the  business  is  financially  inter-
esting  for them.  Furthermore,  these  organisations 
do not limit themselves to smuggling only one na-
tionality,  but  provide  'service'  to  any  customer. 
Links to other forms of OC are consequently of in-
terest  and  therefore  organised  illegal  immigration 
should  not be faced  in  an  isolated  manner. 8. Stolen vehicles 
8.1. Stolen vehicles in  general 
EU  Member States  observed  a general  increase  in 
the  figures  for  vehicle  theft  in  the  years  up  to 
1993. This  was  largely  due  to  the  change  in  the 
political  structures  and  also  the advent of the sin-
gle European market, which meant that there were 
no longer border controls  between  the  EU  Mem-
ber States.  For example,  it is  now possible to drive 
from Portugal in the west across Spain,  France,  Bel-
gium,  the  Netherlands  and  Germany  to  the  Ger-
man-Polish  border without being  checked  at  any 
border. Similarly, there has been a greater freedom 
of movement in  all  the east  European  States  after 
the breakdown  of the  FSU.  This  situation  has  cre-
ated  an  increasing  demand  for  automobiles  in 
eastern  Europe  and  is,  to a large  extent,  being ex-
ploited  by  criminal  networks  involved  in  the  theft 
and trafficking of motor vehicles. 
From  1994 onwards, EU Member States saw a slight 
decrease in vehicle thefts, in  particular,  in the main 
manufacturing  countries.  This  may  be  due to  en-
hanced police efforts, to improved security and de-
tection  systems,  to  modified  regulations  in  insur-
ance contracts or even to the beginning of the satu-
ration of the market. According to the latest EU  leg-
islation, vehicle manufacturers are obliged to install 
alarms and  other security features  in  their new car 
models. In addition, a number of other methods of 
tracking and locating stolen vehicles have appeared 
on the market.  However, whilst the overall  number 
of thefts in western Europe has decreased, it would 
seem  that the incidence of organised  international 
vehicle trafficking is on the increase. 
As  far  as  car  theft is  concerned,  no  other type  of 
criminal activity is as lucrative for such  minimal risk. 
A theft of 100 top-of-the-range cars  can  generate a 
net profit of USD  1 million to  USD  2  million. This 
criminal activity is  more profitable than  prostitution 
or  other  black-market  activities.  According  to  the 
overall  head  of Russian  insurance  companies,  Mr 
Yourgens,  about 700 000 stolen cars  are trafficked 
to east  European  countries annually. 
8.2. Countries of theft 
The  following table indicates the volume of stolen 
vehicles in  the European  Union in  1999, but there 
is  good  reason  for  treating  such  statistics  with 
some  caution.  The  problem  recently  identified  is 
the variation  in  the definition of a vehicle theft be-
Statistics  1999 - Europol 
Country  Stolen  Not 
vehicles  recovered 
Belgium  31  193  12  661 
Denmark  33 930  2 714 
Germany  74 490  34 127 
Greece  17  362  9 964 
Spain  90 790  18  527 
France  297 058  Not known 
Ireland  14 851  791 
Italy  263 493  123  598 
Luxembourg  626  189 
Netherlands  30 575  12  782 
Austria  6 275  3 415 
Portugal  18 250  4  546 
Finland  15  379  1 582 
Sweden  48 328  3 722 
United Kingdom  391  807  200 909 
Total  1 334 407  429 517 
49 tween  EU  Member States.  The  figures  include dif-
ferent types  of offences  and  categories  of vehicle 
in different countries. The figures from some Mem-
ber  States,  for example  the  United  Kingdom,  take 
into  account  all  vehicles  when  recording  thefts; 
Germany  and  Italy  only  record  thefts  of cars  and 
no  other type  of vehicle,  whilst  France  records  all 
vehicles  except  buses,  and  others  include  motor-
bikes in their vehicle theft figures. 
If we look at the development of vehicle theft statis-
tics, there was no common trend in the EU Member 
States in 1999 in comparison with the previous year. 
Denmark,  Germany  and  Italy  seemed  to  have  a 
decrease in  stolen vehicle thefts of between 7 and 
1  0  o;o  in  1999 compared  to  1998, whereas  Fin-
land  and  Portugal  seemed  to have  an  increase  of 
about 13-14  Dfo. 
For  France  (no official  national  collection), the fig-
ures  for  (non)  recovered  vehicles  are  unknown. 
For  Ireland  (see  table),  the  figures  for  non-
recovered  vehicles are  up to September 1999 on-
ly.  Therefore, the indicated total  number has  to be 
interpreted with some caution. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  figures  for  non-
recovered  vehicles  are  as  important as  the figures 
for stolen  vehicles  when  comparing statistics.  Tak-
ing into consideration an  amount of approximately 
78 000 non-recovered vehicles  in  France  (the av-
erage  of the  last  six  years),  the  total  amount  of 
non-recovered vehicles  in  the European  Union ex-
ceeds  500 000.  Compared  to  1998, this  means 
an  increase  of more than  15  Dfo. 
Furthermore,  compared  to  the  total  amount  of 
stolen  vehicles,  the  percentage  of non-recovered 
vehicles  is  approximately 38 Dfo  for the year  1999. 
8.3. Destination countries 
In  about one third  of all  cases,  the Member States 
did not know the final destination. According to the 
information  provided,  they  believed  final  destina-
tions were mainly east European  countries.  Only a 
small  proportion  of the vehicles were destined for 
Africa,  whilst  a  small  number  remained  within 
western  Europe. 
However, for the purpose of putting the issue  into 
perspective,  it must be  mentioned that current in-
telligence  indicates that a considerable  number of 
stolen  vehicles  are  trafficked  within  the  European 
Union itself. 
Countries of recovery 
179 cases of recovered cars stolen in Germany (January 2000} 
2 Ofo 
Ill  East European countries 
Central  European countries 
South-east European countries 
23 °/o  Ill  Africa 
Source: BKA 
50 According  to  several  contributions,  the  principal 
central  and  east  European  countries  involved  as 
countries  of  destination  are  the  Czech  Republic, 
Poland  and  Russia. 
This  means that at  least  Ukraine,  Belarus  and  the 
Baltic  States  are  used  as  transit  countries  for  the 
smuggling of stolen vehicles. 
It  should  be  noted  that two of these  countries  -
the  Czech  Republic  and  Poland  - border directly 
with Germany. 
8.4. Transit 
Basic transit routes comprise the following: 
from western Europe,  especially the EU  Mem-
ber States to east  European countries; 
from the EU  to North Africa; 
from  Europe to Central  and  South  Africa; 
from  Europe to the Middle and  Far  East. 
According  to  the  information  provided  by  some 
Member States,  vehicles stolen  mainly in  Belgium, 
Germany,  France  and  Italy  are  transported  princi-
pally towards the Czech  Republic and  Poland. 
Three  main  transit countries or group of countries 
have  emerged:  Germany  and,  to  a  lesser  extent, 
Italy  and  the  Nordic  countries.  Looking  at  the  UK 
and  Spain,  it appears that both these countries are 
distribution centres for African  countries. 
8.4. 1  . Germany 
Germany  has  acted  as  a transit  country for coun-
tries  such  as  Belgium  and  France.  The  fact  that 
both  these  countries  have  borders  with  Germany 
should  be  underlined.  Moreover,  Germany  has 
been  used  as  a transit  country for stolen  vehicles 
into Italy and  Spain. 
Whether  as  a  transit  country  or  as  a  country  of 
theft,  vehicles  coming from Germany were  mainly 
destined for CEE. 
8.4.2. Italy 
Italy  has  acted  as  a transit  point for countries  like 
Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Spain  and  Switzerland. 
Most of the vehicles either stolen in  Italy or transit-
ing  through  Italy  were  destined  for  south-east 
Europe,  and  also  for the Middle East. 
8.4.3. Nordic countries 
In  this  example,  it is  obvious that Finland  has  act-
ed  as  a transit country. Approximately 90 OJo  of the 
vehicles  recovered  in  this  country  were  destined 
for Estonia  and  principally Russia. 
Sweden has acted either as a transit country in the 
case  of  Belgium,  Germany  and  France  or  as  a 
source  country. 
8.5. Organised crime 
involvement 
This type of criminality is mostly very well organised 
particularly when it concerns  the international traf-
ficking of stolen vehicles. Groups of criminals are or-
ganised just like a large international company. They 
have  very  sophisticated  structures.  For  example, 
some  will  specialise  in  the  production  of forged 
vehicle and identity documentation, while others are 
skilled  mechanics who undertake the alteration  of 
the vehicle  identity  (VIN/chassis  number,  produc-
tion  number,  number plates,  etc.).  Then  there are 
the couriers who are hired to drive the vehicles from 
one country to another. Finally, another person sells 
the car to a usually innocent purchaser at the end of 
the chain. These organisations may consist of many 
different nationalities along the chain. 
8.6. Modi operandi 
It  is  clear  that  the  modi 
operandi  of  the  groups 
evolve as quickly as the cir-
cumstances  change.  A few 
years  ago,  it  was  quite  a 
simple  matter  for  thieves 
to break  into  a parked  car. 
However,  since  most  of the  cars  are  now being 
equipped with very sophisticated locks,  alarms,  im-
51 mobilising  systems  and  other  security  features, 
other methods are being used. In addition to these 
modi  operandi,  there  are  still  other  methods  of 
vehicle theft. 
'Carjacking',  as  it  is  caHed,  is  a methcxl  which  is 
being used  incFeasingly to gain  possession of vehi-
cles. Threats of violence and the use of firearms to 
steal  vehicles are  becoming worrying phenomena. 
Furthermore,  there  are  cases  of 'showroomjack-
ing',  where  offenders  are  breaking  into  vehicle 
showrooms  and  stealing  cars.  In  Italy,  there  are 
cases  of 'highwayjacking',  where offenders cause 
a small accident. After the driver of the targeted ve-
hicle stops for the purpose of exchanging informa-
tion for the insurance claim, violence is  used  in  or-
der  to  force  him/her  to  surrender  the  car  to 
his/her aggressors. 
There have been a large number of violent vehicle 
crimes  reported  in  Belgium  in  the past few years 
and  also  many cases  in  Spain,  Italy,  Luxembourg 
and  the  Netherlands. 
The  above-described methods have the advantage 
of obtaining possession  of the vehicle, the original 
documents and the keys  at the same time. There-
fore,  it  is  no longer necessary for the offenders to 
overcome  sophisticated  mobilising  systems  in-
stalled on  the vehicles. 
The  thieves also  carry  out burglaries  in  houses for 
the purpose of obtaining the keys to the vehicle in 
the  garage.  Once  the  keys  have  been  stolen,  the 
vehicle  is  taken  shortly afterwards. 
It  must be  added  that a very  large  number of re-
ported  thefts  are,  in  fact,  insurance  frauds,  where 
the owner reports  a car  stolen  but has  actually ei-
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ther sold the car to a third person or destroyed the 
vehicle  himself/herself  in  order  to  obtain  the  in-
sured  value. 
In  many  incidents,  offenders  have  made  use  of 
forged  documents (such  as  insurance cards,  pass-
ports,  identity cards,  registration  documents,  etc.). 
This enables the traffickers of stolen motor vehicles 
to  overcome  problems  caused  by  possible  police 
checks  and/or border controls.  In  order to give  an 
impression  of authenticity,  in  some  cases  licence 
plates  have  been  changed  into those of the desti-
nation  country.  Furthermore,  it  has  appeared  that 
the  VIN/serial  number and  engine  number were 
also  altered and/or falsified. 
Particularly  in  Germany,  traffickers  sometimes pre-
fer to steal  rented vehicles to avoid  problems with 
forged  documents. 
8.  7.  Conclusions 
The problem of trafficking stolen vehicles still exists 
and  very similar patterns can  be found throughout 
the EU.  There  is  always  a market for second-hand 
vehicles  at  a  cheap  price  - particularly  in  those 
countries  which  are  not  so  economically  devel-
oped  or do  not manufacture vehicles  themselves. 
Certainly,  some types  of vehicles  are  valued  more 
than  others:  four-wheel  drive  vehicles  are  in 
demand. 
It  is  also  important  not to  forget  thefts  of lorries 
and  trucks.  This  frequently  ignored  crime  actually 
requires  more demanding organisational  skills  and 
extensive  criminal  structures,  but usually produces 
higher profits. 9. Recommendations 
The  impact that EE-OC  is  having on  the European 
Union  is  difficult to quantify in  exact  terms due to 
the vastness of its activities and networks, which al-
so  extend  beyond  the  European  continent.  How-
ever,  it  can  be  safely  concluded  that the  criminal 
capabilities  and  potential  are  certainly  high  and 
constantly growing. 
Therefore,  a  greater  acknowledgement  of the  in-
creasing  threat  of east  European  organised  crime 
to the European  Union  should  be  made by  taking 
prioritised  steps for the adoption and  implementa-
tion  of a legislative  framework  concerning  judicial 
and  law enforcement cooperation with  Russia. 
In  order to assist  effectively the  competent  Euro-
pean  Union institutions in  identifying the most ap-
propriate policies,  Europol should be provided with 
all  relevant information and  intelligence concerning 
east  European  criminals  residing and  active  in  the 
Member States. This will allow the development of 
a  more  accurate  and  reliable  European  Union 
overview  concerning  the  issue.  As  a  result,  the 
identification and  adoption of common preventive 
and  repressive actions will be facilitated at all  levels 
of concerned European Union and  Member States' 
institutions and  agencies. 
Together with such  efforts, Member States'  law en-
forcement bodies  involved  in  contrasting  east  Eu-
ropean  criminal  organisations  in  their  countries 
should  join  forces  in  a more  practical  and  opera-
tionally  effective  manner with  Europol.  The  initial 
legal foundations provided by the Europol Conven-
tion,  its  implementing  regulations  and  two  recent 
Council  recommendations offer a starting point on 
which to build. 
Constant attention should also focus on deepening 
relations  and  supporting as  well  as  intensifying co-
operation  on  training programmes with  east  Euro-
pean  countries  such  as  those  currently  in  place 
and  funded  through  the  European  bodies 
(Falcone,  Tacis,  Phare). 
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55 Annex I 
Political and legal 
framework 
1.1.  Action plan on organised 
crime 
The basis for the cooperation between the EU  and 
east  European  States  in  this  area  was  formed  by 
the conclusions of the EU-Russian  Conference on 
Organised  Crime  held  on  4  and  5  December 
1996 in  Helsinki. 
The  other starting point was the action  plan  on  or-
ganised  crime  developed  by  the  high-level  group 
and  adopted  by the  European  Council  of Amster-
dam on  16 and  17 June  1997 (104). 
In  its  resolution  on  the  action  plan  to  combat 
OC  (1°5)  adopted on  20 November 1997, the  Eu-
ropean  Parliament  suggested  that  'in  addition  to 
the  transatlantic  partners,  Russia  and  Ukraine,  the 
States  with which closer cooperation  in  combating 
organised  ~rime is  sought should  also  include Be-
larus.  The  same  applies  to  those  States  in  which 
large  quantities of drugs  are  produced for the  Eu-
ropean  market  or  which  are  regarded  as  transit 
countries for drugs'. 
In  Crimorg  28 (106), the  incoming  UK  Presidency 
set  out the  background  to  the  EU's  engagement 
with  Russia  in  the fight against  OC.  This  paper re-
ports on the outcome of the meeting of EU  liaison 
officers  in  Moscow,  notes  the  outcome of the  in-
augural  meeting  of  the  EU-Russia  Cooperation 
( 104)  Recommendation 4:  'It is  necessary to develop closer co-
operation with other countries and  international organisa-
tions  and  bodies  involved  in  the fight  against  organised 
crime.  In  particular,  relations with the Union's transatlantic 
partners  as  well  as  w1th  Russia  and  Ukraine need to be 
developed,  the  latter two for  instance  through  the  TaCis 
programme: 
(1°5)  Document 7421/97-(4-0199/97. 
(1°6)  Document 12784/97 Crimorg 28. 
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Council  on  27 January  1998 and  sets  out propos-
als for future cooperation with  Russia  in  this field. 
The  Multidisciplinary  Group  on  Organised 
Crime  (MDG) at  an  early stage  decided (1°7): 
to concentrate on  measures to promote prac-
tical  cooperation; 
to use  existing mechanisms and  programmes 
(especially Tacis,  liaison  officers,  Europol); 
to convene a forum, consisting of a represen-
tative  from  each  institution  or  international 
body  involved,  in  order  to  provide  an 
overview  of  their  current  and  planned  initia-
tives  so  as  to avoid  duplication with the work 
of  other  institutions  (G7/P8,  Council  of  Eu-
rope,  FATF); 
to  produce  a  paper  listing  current  bilateral 
agreements between  EU  Member States  and 
Russia  (covering fiscal  questions, crime and  is-
sues  of cooperation  between  Member States 
and  Russia); 
that - to  maintain  continuity - Europol  with 
the  assistance  of  the  General  Secretariat 
should  monitor the  state  of play  concerning 
relevant  agreements  and  memoranda  of un-
derstanding and should provide an  annual up-
date on  these  instruments. 
(1°7)  Document 7771/98 Crimorg 62. 1.2.  Partnership 
and cooperation 
agreements {PCAs) 
between the EU  and east 
European countries 
EU-Russian  relations  took  a  significant  step  for-
v:'ard with the  EU-Russia partnership and  coopera-
tion  agreement,  which  came  into  force  on  1 De-
cember  1997.  A  Cooperation  Council  discussed 
and  adopted  the  joint  PCA  work  programme  for 
1998  in  addition  to  two  other  important  docu-
ments.  A cooperation  committee  was  created  at 
the  first  meeting  of  the  Cooperation  Council  on 
27  January  1998.  Furthermore,  the  Cooperation 
Council  started establishing its own  subcommittee. 
Concerning justice  and  home  affairs  (1°8), the  fol-
lowing was  decided: 
'Both sides will seek to give new impetus to cooper-
~ti~n in  tackling organised crime including drug traf-
f1ck1ng and illegal activities in the sphere of econom-
ics. They will explore, in particular, the possibilities for 
enhancing practical law enforcement cooperation: 
In  the  meantime,  the  EU  developed  similar  rela-
tions  on  a legal  basis with  Moldova  and  Ukraine. 
The  EU-Ukraine  PCA  came  into  force  in  March 
1998. The  EU-Moldova  PCA  - already  signed  in 
November  1997  - came  into  force  on  1  July 
1998.  Key  items  of  these  PCAs  are  the  fight 
against OC  (Articles  66 and  76), particularly mon-
ey  laundering,  drug  trafficking  and  customs  coop-
eration  (Article  73) (109). Other objectives  are  the 
protection  of intellectual  property rights,  as  well  as 
the  restriction  of drugs and  arms trafficking. 
EU PCAs with east European countries are unique in-
struments of the European Union's external relations, 
providing a structure for concrete and coordinated ac-
tions. They are the only existing legal frameworks for 
decisions on all aspects of the fight against OC C  10). 
(1°8)  Article  84 of the EU-Russia  PCA. 
( 109)  Another  subcommittee  deals  with  customs  issues.  Main 
topics are  current fraud  and  contraband  practices  in  cus-
toms transit,  particularly  concerning the  operation  of the 
TIR system  in  Russia  and effects of fraud because of false 
declarations of the value of goods. 
C  10)  EU  Commissioner  responsible  for  external  affairs,  Hans 
van  den Broek,  Moscow,  9 and  10 July  1998. 
These political  decisions are indirectly directives for 
the  working  programmes  of Europol.  As  a conse-
quence, Europol's EE-OC project has to encompass 
at least the PCA countries of the territory of the FSU. 
1.3.  The  impact of the Treaty 
of Amsterdam 
The  Vienna  European  Council  in  December  1998 
called for a strengthening of EU action against OC in 
the  light  of  the  new  possibilities  opened  by  the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. The Finnish Presidency, in line 
with the mandate of the Vienna  European Council, 
considered  a follow-up  in  which  the  different  ele-
ments  should  be  brought together into one  docu-
ment, with a specification of what action should be 
carried out and with what priority, who should have 
responsibility,  and  in  accordance  with  what 
timetable. This document is the 'EU strategy for the 
beginning of the new millennium -The prevention 
and control of OC' C  11). It is the basis for common 
European activities concerning the fight against OC. 
The  EU  strategy  stresses  the  responsibility  of  Eu-
ropol and its intermediary role for closer cooperation 
as well as further arrangements with Russia, Ukraine 
and other transatlantic partners. 
In  the  conclusions  of  the  Tampere  Confer-
ence C  12)  held  on  15  and  16  October  1999, the 
European  Council  was  deeply  committed  to  rein-
forcing  the  fight  against  serious  organised  and 
transnational  crime.  The  European  Council  called 
for  joint  investigative  teams,  as  foreseen  in  the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, to be set up without delay as 
a first  step  to  combating  trafficking  in  drugs  and 
human beings. The rules to be set up should allow 
representatives  of Europol  to  participate  as  appro-
priate  in  such  teams  in  a support  capacity.  More-
over, the  European  Council  encouraged the estab-
lishment of a 'European  police  chiefs'  operational 
task force'  to  exchange  - in  cooperation  with  Eu-
ropol  - experience,  best practices and  information 
on  current  trends  in  cross-border  crime  and  con-
tribute  to  the  planning  of  operative  actions.  Fur-
thermore,  a European  police  college  for the  train-
ing  of  senior  law  enforcement  officials  should  be 
founded. The European Council  underlined the im-
portance of addressing the drug problem. 
(1 11 )  Document 9423/99 Crimorg 80. 
C 
12
)  D~c~ment SN  200/99  EN  CAB  of the  European  Com-
miSSion. 
57 1.4.  Common strategy of the EU 
on  Russia 
According to the  PCA  between the EU  and  Russia, 
the European  Council  adopted a common strategy 
on  Russia C 
13
)  in  May  1999. It was stated that the 
fight against EE-OC C  14)  is  an  obvious priority. The 
following  areas  of  action  concerning  the  EE-OC 
project were included: 
to  develop  the  cooperation  of  Europol  with 
competent Russian  authorities as  provided for 
under the Europol  Convention notably for im-
proving the fight against illicit trafficking in  hu-
man  beings  and  drugs,  as  well  as  illegal  im-
migration; 
to  intensify  cooperation  between  liaison  offi-
cers  of the Member States  in  Moscow, within 
the limits of their respective  national  laws; 
to  develop  cooperation  mechanisms  in  com-
bating transnational  drug crime; 
to  combat illegal  migration  including continu-
ing  the  basic  and  advanced  training  courses 
for  staff  members  of  border  and  migration 
authorities. 
During the  meeting  in  Cologne  held  on  3  and  4 
June  1999, the European Council decided on the 
common strategy of the  EU  in  respect of Russia.  It 
was  stressed  that this  first  strategy will  strengthen 
the  strategic  partnership  between  Russia  and  the 
EU,  which  is  so  crucial  to  maintaining  peace  and 
security in  Europe. In addition, the European Coun-
cil  welcomed  the  increasing  cooperation  with 
Ukraine under the PCA in force since March  1998. 
Full  use  should  be  made  of the  considerable  po-
tential  afforded  by  that agreement so  as  to  bring 
Ukraine into closer contact with the EU. A common 
strategy  on  Ukraine  should  be  prepared  for com-
pletion. 
C 
13
)  EU-Russian  common  strategy,  document  7073/5/99 
REV  5 PESC  72 COEST  9. 
C  14)  lnclud1ng  actions  to  fight  corruption,  money  laundering, 
trafficking in  drugs,  human beings and  illegal immigration. 
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1.5.  EU  action plan on  common 
action for Russia  on  com-
bating organised crime 
{EU-Russia action plan on 
organised crime) 
In  accordance  with  the  Common  strategy  of the 
EU  on  Russia,  an  action  plan  on  common  action 
for the Russian  Federation on combating organised 
crime  was  drawn  up.  This  action  plan  was  ap-
proved by Russia  at the Cooperation Council meet-
ing on  10 April  2000 and  is  now established  as  a 
joint plan for shaping cooperation between the Eu-
ropean  Union and  the Russian  Federation. 
The action plan establishes the improvement of in-
ternational  judicial  cooperation  as  a  priority  and 
sets out the steps to be taken toward this end. The 
same  is  done with  regard  to  law  enforcement co-
operation  by  listing  the  steps  to  be  taken  by  the 
Union  to  promote,  with  Russian  law  enforcement 
authorities,  development of arrangements  particu-
larly regarding: 
technical,  operational  and  strategic  informa-
tion  and  intelligence  exchange  between  the 
EU  and  Russia; 
establishment  of  central  Russian  contact 
points for information exchange with the  EU; 
training  courses  for  Russian  law  enforcement 
personnel  to  develop  good  practice  in  the 
field  of international cooperation; 
further development of cooperation  between 
the  Member States'  liaison  officers  in  Russia 
thereby ensuring that these officers meet on a 
regular basis; 
development of cooperation between Europol 
and  the  competent  Russian  agencies,  in  ac-
cordance  with  the  Europol  Convention,  as 
provided  for  in  the  EU  common  strategy  on 
Russia. Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
Annex II 
The European Union 
and Russia (  1 15) 
Measures, memoranda of understanding, 
joint actions and other agreements 
Agreement  Area covered 
Under negotiation  Police cooperation 
Agreement between the Russian Authorities and the  Fight against 
Belgian Government  organised crime 
Under negotiation  Police cooperation 
Under negotiation  Agreement to  tackle 
organised crime 
Draft agreement between Russia and Germany, 
January  1996 
Signed: 9 June  1998 
Mutual joint action to fight international crime  Trafficking in  drugs,  arms, 
(permanent working group)  stolen vehicles and  human 
beings,  high-tech  crime,  and 
money laundering 
Signed:  21  May  1981 
Convention  between the  Hellenic Republic and the  Judicial  assistance  in  civil  and 
Union of Soviet Socialist  Republics  criminal  matters (convention 
also applies  in  respect of 
Russia  in accordance with 
the  law of the  succession  of 
States  in  international 
conventions) 
Signed:  24  February  1984  Exchange of verbal  notes on 
cancellation  of legislation 
and  expedition  of register 
office certificates 
C 
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)  Table  summarising the replies  concerning bilateral  agreements  between  Member States  and  Russia,  Multidisciplinary Group  on 
Organised Crime (MDG), Room  Document No 3,  Brussels,  7 and  8 May  1998. 
59 Country  Agreement  Area covered 
Signed: 26 October  1990 
Agreement between the  Spanish  Foreign  Ministry  Agreement on  cooperation 
and the Government of the Soviet Union  in the field  of the fight 
against drug trafficking 
Signed:  26 October  1990 
Convention  on  Judicial Assistance  in  Civil  Matters 
Signed: 25  March  1996 
Convention  on  Judicial  Assistance  in  Criminal  Matters 
(has  not yet entered  into force) 
Signed:  21  February  1998 
Convention  between the  Spanish  Ministry of Justice  Transfer of convicts 
and the  Russian  General  Prosecutor's office 
Under negotiation  Cooperation in  the field of 
the  fight against organised 
crime 
France  Signed:  24 November  1997 
Protocol  between the French  Ministry of the Interior  Police cooperation 
and the Russian  Ministry of the Interior 
Rules of reciprocity and  the application  of the  French  Judicial  cooperation 
law of 1  0 March  1927 cover this  area 
Ireland  Signed:  10 February 2000 
Agreements  between the Ministry of the  Interior  Agreement on  combating 
of the  Russian  Federation  and  An  Garda  Siochana  drug trafficking 
(Ireland's  national  police service)  Agreement on  fighting 
organised  crime 
Italy  Signed:  11  September  1993 
Agreement between the  Ministry of the  Interior of the  Cooperation  in  the field  of 
Russian  Federation  and the Ministry of the  Interior  combating the  organised 
of the  Italian  Republic  crime and  illegal turnover of 
narcotics and  psychoactive 
agents 
Under negotiation  Terrorism 
Luxembourg  No agreements 
Netherlands  Signed:  1 October  1997 
Agreement between the  Ministry of Justice of the  Judicial  cooperation 
Russian  Federation  and the Ministry of Justice of the  Central  contact points 
Netherlands  in  Moscow 
60 Country  Agreement  Area covered 
Austria  Signed:  1997 
Memorandum of understanding between the Austrian  Police  cooperation 
Ministry of the Interior and the Russian  Ministry 
of the Interior 
Signed:  (renewable annually) 
Memorandum of understanding between the Austrian  Police cooperation 
Ministry of the Interior and the Russian  FSB 
Portugal  Under negotiation 
Agreement between Russia and Portugal  Judicial cooperation on 
organised crime and 
terrorism 
Finland  Signed:  5 March  1993 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic  Cooperation of customs 
of Finland  and the Government of the Russian  and  law enforcement 
Federation  agencies  in  the prevention 
of crime 
(entered into force in  1994) 
Signed:  11  March  1994 
Agreement between the Government of the Republic  Cooperation and  mutual 
of Finland  and the Government of the Russian  assistance  in  customs areas 
Federation 
Sweden  Signed:  13 January  1988 
Agreement between the Government of Sweden  Matters related to the issuing 
and  the Government of the Soviet Union  of visas 
Signed:  27 January  1994 
Agreement between the Government of Sweden  Mutual assistance  in 
and the Government of the Russian  Federation  customs matters 
Signed:  19 April  1995 
Agreement between the Government of Sweden and  Police  cooperation 
the Government of the Russian  Federation,  including 
additional protocols signed  on 30 October  1996 and 
2 December  1997 
Signed:  2 May  1996 
Agreement on cooperation between the Swedish 
National Police  Board  and the Russian  Federal  Security 
Service 
61 Country  Agreement  Area covered 
Signed:  2 May  1996 
Agreement between the Swedish  National Police  Board 
and the Russian  Ministry of Internal Affairs 
Signed:  2 December  1997 
Agreement on  cooperation  between the Swedish 
National  Police  Board  and  the Russian  Fiscal  Police 
Force 
Signed: 2 December  1997 
Agreement between the Government of Sweden and 
the Government of the Russian  Federation 
Signed:  2 December  1997 
Mutual assistance in 
combating certain fiscal 
offences 
Agreement on  cooperation  between the Swedish  Judicial  cooperation 
Ministry of Justice and the Russian  Ministry of Justice 
Signed:  19 April  1998 
Agreement between the Swedish  National Police  Board 
and the Russian  Currency and  Export Control Committee 
United 
Kingdom 
Signed:  October  1997 
Agreement between the Russian  Federation  and the  Cooperation in fighting crime 
62 
United  Kingdom of Great Britain  and  Northern Ireland 
Signed:  6 January  1994 
Memorandum of understanding between her Majesty's  Cooperation and  mutual 
Customs and  Excise  of the United  Kingdom of Great  assistance 
Britain  and  Northern Ireland  and  the State  Customs 
Committee of the Russian  Federation 
Signed:  18 June  1998 
Multi-agency memorandum of understanding between  Serious crimes,  organised 
the UK  (NCIS,  NCS,  Customs and  Excise,  Fraud  Office,  crime,  and  drugs 
ACPO  and  Crown  Prosecution  Service)  and  Russia 
(Ministry of the Interior) 
Negotiation ongoing for similar document with Tax  Police 
l  I 
l  l 
Nls~  On  7 November 1996, Russia  signed the European Convention on ·Mutual Legal Assistance 
l iand the European Convention on Extradition, dated  13  December 1957. Neither convention 
1  has been ratified. Country 
Germany 
Spain 
Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Annex Ill 
The European Union 
and Ukraine 
Measures, memoranda of understanding, 
joint actions and other agreements 
Agreement  Area covered 
Signed:  6 February  1995 
Agreement to fight organised crime 
Signed: 9 June  1998 
EU  agreement on assistance in  extradition 
Protocol  of 1  0 April  1997 developing some aspects  General cooperation 
of the collaboration agreement between Ukraine 
and the European  Communities (14 June  1994) 
Convention of 7 October  1996 on  Social  Security 
(ratified on 4 February  1998) 
Agreement of 7 October  1996 on transport by air 
Treaty of 8 October  1996 on  Friendship and  Cooperation 
Convention of 7 October  1996 on  Education and 
Cultural Cooperation 
Agreement of 16 June  1995 on  international transport 
by road 
Resolutions on  import limitations for raw aluminium 
(18 August  1993, RCL/1993/2499) 
Signed: 23 May  1999 
Governmental agreement concerning the fight against 
crime 
Signed:  1  0 May 2000 
Agreement between the Swedish  National Police  Board 
and the Ukrainian  Ministry of the Interior 
Signed:  16 January  1998: 
Multi-agency memorandum of understanding between  Serious crimes,  organised 
the UK  (NCIS,  Customs and  Excise,  ACPO  and  Crown  crime, and drugs 
Prosecution  Service)  and  Ukraine (Customs Security 
Service,  MVD and  Tax  Police) 
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Short historical 
overview of organised 
crime in the USSR/Russia 
Although  EE-OC  has  been  operating  within  the 
United  States  for  the  past  25  years,  there  has 
been,  until  now,  limited  reliable  information  avail-
able  to  law  enforcement  agencies.  Linguistic  and 
cultural  differences  have  made their organisations 
hard to penetrate and  the immigrants have a deep 
mistrust of the police. 
Until  now,  little has  been  known  about the history 
of organised crime in the former Soviet Union, due 
to the secrecy associated  with the Government of 
the former Soviet Union. Russian  history, as with all 
histories,  reveals  the existence  of thieves and  rob-
bers dating back centuries. 
The criminal underworld, known to its members as 
the  Vorovskoi  mir  ('Thieves  society'  or  'Thieves 
world'), has existed on the margins of Russian life for 
centuries.  In the late Tsarist era,  outlaw bands were 
glamorous  because  of  their  struggle  against 
landowners and an oppressive State. The traditional 
gang structure, fortified by a code of honour and rit-
uals that discouraged outsiders, became a model for 
the early Bolshevik clandestine organisations C  16). 
During the Bolshevik revolution, Russia experienced 
a long period  of disorder.  Revolutionaries  roamed 
the countryside stealing and attacking authorities in 
the name of the revolution.  Bandits were recruited 
for so-called  expropriations,  carried  out in  order to 
raise  funds.  Following  the  revolution,  the  Soviets 
continued their relations with these criminal gangs. 
They were used as enforcers and informers against 
political dissidents in the Gulag. 
Most organised crime prevalent in  Russia  is a result 
of economic fluctuations. These,  in  turn,  have their 
C  16)  Stephen  Handelman, The  Russian Mafiya,  pp.  85-86. 
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long-term  causal  factors  embedded  in  the period 
1940-70. The  following summarised  historical  se-
quence traces  the progress.  All  such  factors  were, 
in  the  long-term,  conducive  to  the  growth  of 
organised  crime groups. 
The former Soviet Union survived the Second World 
War after hardly avoiding initial defeat. At a compar-
atively  late  stage,  its  industry  was  mobilised  and 
placed  on  a war footing. This tardiness was  due to 
Stalin's  disastrous  priority of the eradication  of the 
internal  political  enemy;  only  during  the  period 
1943-45, with the military turning point achieved, 
was  industrial production approaching full  capacity, 
giving the standard false stimulus that war affords to 
economic growth. Stalin remained suspicious of the 
western allies, and in the very period when western 
Europe  was  striving  for retrenchment,  demobilisa-
tion and social reform and welfare, the Soviet econ-
omy remained on a quasi-military footing. 
Such  a resume is a general description. It does not 
detail  the  combined  west  European  and  US  re-
sponses  to the various  cold-war crises;  responses 
which  met  with  some  undoubted  success.  The 
salient  point of the  description,  however,  remains 
that  of the  resulting  totalitarian  economic  and  fi-
nancial  planning.  Such  economic  planning  was 
made  out  of  necessity,  without  ideologically  ac-
cepting,  or  taking  into  account,  the  regional  eco-
nomic  developments  and  the  shortfall  involving 
cash/credit proportions. 
In  global  terms,  credit  flow and  credit transfer  in-
creased  in  western  Europe,  and  intensified  com-
mercial  activity  by  increasing  the  availability  of 
large-scale  funds.  During  a  single  decade, 
1968-78,  deposits  held  in  western  hemisphere 
tax  havens  by  US-based  holders  increased  from USD  1.5  billion  to  USD  159  billion.  In  a  similar 
1  0-year period,  1970-80, the early growth  rate  of 
the Eurodollar market was  over 27  Ofo. 
A  market  economy  emerges  when  prices  in  the 
markets  of a given  area  fluctuate  in  unison.  Once 
such  price groupings fluctuate  in  a sort of unison, 
accompanied  by  coordinates  of forming  politico-
strategic blocs,  a form of pro-capitalism  in  regional 
or central zones emerges. This occurred during the 
period  1980-83, and  particularly after the  1980s, 
and,  whilst  free  business  initiative  was  stifled,  a 
market economy within the eastern  bloc operated 
in  that  coherent albeit  illogical  trade  circuits  were 
established  on  the apparently contradictory axis  of 
single  trade  centres.  The  former Soviet  Union  as-
cribed to itself in  terms of export of produce in  re-
turn for heavily protecting the industrial  plant. 
This  economic area  was  virtually bypassed  by the 
massive increase in credit and currency flow experi-
enced by the United States and western Europe dur-
ing the period  1950 to the early  1970s. During the 
1960s  and  1970s,  the  relationship  between  the 
State and organised crime reached new heights. The 
Communist 'centrally planned economy' was suited 
to the growth of heavy industry, but was  unable to 
meet consumer demands. The scarcity of consumer 
goods amounted to nationwide shortages  of virtu-
ally any item the consumer wanted.  Subsequently, 
the Soviet  leadership further cultivated  its  relation-
ship  and  used  the criminal  organisations to satisfy 
the  consumer  needs,  the  Communist  Party 
(nomenclature) and Soviet society. 
The  fact  that these  needs  were  met by  organisa-
tions which  stole,  smuggled,  bribed  and  terrorised 
was  of little consequence. Organised  crime groups 
have  exploited  these  shortages  in  the  past  and 
continue  to do  so  even  though  the  Soviet  Union 
no  longer exists.  This  was  a profitable area  of ille-
gal trade from which both criminals and State ben-
efited.  During this period, several  large criminal  or-
ganisations  evolved.  One  of the  largest  was  the 
Uzbek  Mafia,  which  had  ties  to  every  level  of the 
Communist Party. 
These  shortcomings of Communism created  a so-
ciety of people who were brought up learning how 
to manipulate the system  to obtain the necessities 
of life and  to obtain a better standard  of living. 
This knowledge included bribing officials and paying 
protection to get good jobs, housing, education and 
business. Beating the system became a way of life. 
Although  perestroika  was  intended to address  the 
problems that were a part of the centralised Soviet 
economy, the social and  economic changes, which 
accompanied  the  process,  contributed  to  the 
growth  of  organised  crime  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
When  measures  were  introduced  which  broad-
ened  the  area  of  private  commerce,  organised 
crime groups used  the opportunity to  infiltrate the 
legitimate  Soviet  economy  with  funds  that  had 
been  obtained  illegally.  Cooperatives,  banks  and 
stock  comp;mies  were  all  penetrated  by  'black' 
funds from both official  and  criminal sources. 
Finally,  in  1991, a failed  coup  d'etat provided  the 
opportunity for reformers to alter the course of the 
Soviet experiment. 
By  1992,  the  Soviet  Union  was  no  more.  In  its 
place  15  sovereign  States  now  existed,  adminis-
tered by no central authority. The  borders between 
these States  were porous and  smuggling of Soviet 
resources was  rampant. 
Although  a number of the former Soviet  republics 
had  come together to form the Commonwealth of 
Independent  States  (CIS),  levels  of  cooperation 
within  this  alliance  were  low.  Subsequently,  little 
agreement  was  reached  on  the  state  of the  bor-
ders and  smuggling continued  unabated. 
By  the  time  measures  within  the  CIS  were  devel-
oped to regulate the flow of people and goods be-
tween  States,  the  profits  generated  by  previous 
smuggling operations were already being put back 
into  the  legitimate  economies  of  the  successor 
States.  As  had  happened  before,  privatisation 
plans,  real-estate projects and new financial  institu-
tions were infiltrated by criminal  organisations. 
In  1993,  FBI  officials  claimed  that there  were  15 
organised  crime  groups  from  the  former  Soviet 
Union  operating  in  18  cities  within  the  United 
States. 
Comparing  their  arrival  with  the  arrival  of  Italians 
who formed the Cosa  Nostra, the following similar-
ities surfaced: 
they arrived  by way of mass  immigration; 
they settled  in  small  urban  enclaves; 
they shared  a common language; 
they exploited their own people. 
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)  indicates  that east  European  organ-
ised  crime  groups  can  be  classified  into four gen-
eral  groups,  as  follows. 
Old Soviet-style criminal enterprise 
This  group  is  a circle  of corrupt Communist  Party 
officials,  production  and  distribution  bosses,  cor-
rupt regional government officials, and  involving lo-
cal  and  regional  criminal  bosses  and  gangs. 
The  top  level  is  'The  elite'.  They  carry  out the or-
ganisational  and  administrative  functions.  They  do 
not commit the criminal acts and  as a result are in-
sulated from the crime. Two  groups share the next 
level. 
The  suppliers:  They  ensure  that  orders  are 
carried  out  according  to  the  wishes  of  'The 
elite'.  They  settle  disputes  between  groups 
and  ensure  communication  between  criminal 
families. 
The  security:  They  include  corrupt  officials 
and  journalists  who  provide  social  prestige 
and  assist the criminals  by  informing them of 
any  investigations  and  insulating  them  from 
the criminal  responsibilities of their acts. 
The  base  is  occupied  by the people who commit 
the offences,  i.e.  thieves,  con  men and  burglars. 
Ethnic-based criminal enterprise 
These  groups  are  clan-based  and  are  somewhat 
structured, such  as Chechen, Azerbaijani, Georgian, 
and  Dagestanian  groups.  The  leader's  position  in 
the group depends on  his stature within the group 
and  how he  gets  along  with  other groups  within 
their ethnic community. 
C  17)  FBI,  National  Drug Intelligence Center, Russian Organized 
Crime- A baseline perspective,  United States, November 
1993. 
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Thieves-in-law (Vary V  Zakonye) 
The  thief-in-law is  considered  to  be the top ech-
elon  of the  criminal  hierarchy  in  EE-OC.  These 
elite  criminals  earned  their title through  an  elec-
tion  by  the  heads  of various  convict gangs  while 
serving  a  prison  term.  Once  elected,  they  must 
take  an  oath  and  are  crowned  in  an  induction 
ceremony.  Under the thief-in-law are  supervisors 
(Smatryaschiy)  who  run  the  gangs  of  fighters 
(Baetz),  who conduct the day-to-day criminal  ac-
tivities.  Under the Baetz are  helpers,  people who 
are  not in  the organisation,  but who provide sup-
port to the thief-in-law. 
Within  the  ranks  of  the  thief-in-law  is  an  inner 
council  (Bratski  krug),  a panel  of leading  bosses 
who  operate  a  kind  of  overseeing  council.  They 
meet  to  settle  disputes  over  territory  and  trans-
gressions  within  the  organisation.  Leadership,  it is 
believed,  is  determined by succession. 
Other criminal enterprises 
These are  groups which operate in  a particular re-
gion,  are  led  by  a  powerful  leader,  or  whose 
members  are  involved  in  similar  occupations  or 
criminal  activities.  In  the  late  1980s,  the  Soviet 
Union  still  refused  to  acknowledge  the  fact  that 
organised  criminal  groups  existed.  In  June  1997, 
the  Centre  for  Strategic  and  International  Studies 
(CSIS)  and  FBI  reported that,  in  the United States, 
26  Russian  OC  groups  were  active  (the  Russian 
Ministry  of the  Interior  counted  24 groups).  The 
Organizatsiya  operates  in  Los  Angeles,  Miami, 
and  New  York  (more  specifically  Brighton  Beach 
near  Brooklyn,  also  called  'Little  Odessa'),  and 
other groups  in  New Jersey,  Boston,  San  Francis-
co,  Chicago,  Seattle,  Denver,  Cleveland,  Detroit 
and  Philadelphia. Europol 
European Union situation report on east European organised crime 
Luxembourg:  Office for Official  Publications of the  European  Communities 
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